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The Transition to Investment-Based
Social Security When Portfolio
Returns and Capital Proﬁtability
Are Uncertain
Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova,
and Andrew Samwick
In this paper, we study the transition from a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) sys-
tem of social security pensions to an investment-based system in an econ-
omy in which portfolio returns and capital proﬁtability are both uncertain.
The paper extends earlier studies by Feldstein and Samwick (1997, 1998a,
1998b) that modeled the transition process in a nonstochastic environ-
ment and by Feldstein and Ranguelova (forthcoming) that examined the
implication of portfolio risk after the transition to an investment-based
system has been completed.
Our analysis shows that contributions to personal retirement accounts
(PRAs) that are less than one-third of the projected PAYGO tax rate can
eventually ﬁnance annuity payments that exceed the oﬃcially projected
level of future social security pensions with very high probability. The re-
maining moderate level of retiree risk can be completely eliminated by a
government guarantee that can be provided with very little risk to taxpay-
ers. Although the transition to a pure investment-based system is the natu-
ral case to analyze, we also consider a more realistic policy of a transition
to a mixed system that in the long run is one-third investment based and
two-thirds pay as you go; this is the stochastic extension of the study by
Feldstein and Samwick (1998a). It corresponds to a policy of maintaining
the current payroll-tax rate and using investment-based accounts to main-
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tion ages.
We begin the paper in section 2.1 with a summary of the social security
simulation model that we use and of the statistical parameters incorpo-
rated into our simulations of alternative policy rules. Section 2.2 then sets
the stage for the stochastic simulations that are the primary focus of this
paper by analyzing a relatively transparent nonstochastic transition from
the existing PAYGO system to a fully funded system with the same pro-
jected beneﬁts. We consider four alternative simulations. The basic calcu-
lations assume that the funds in the PRAs earn 5.5 percent, the average
postwar real portfolio rate of return on a sixty-forty stock-bond portfolio
after a 0.4 percent allowance for administrative costs. An alternative sim-
ulation (presented in sec. 2.2.1) increases this return to approximately 7.5
percent by assuming that the federal government credits to the PRAs the
incremental federal corporate-tax revenue that results from the PRA-
induced increase in capital accumulation. Our third simulation (sec. 2.2.2)
assumes a real rate of return of 3.7 percent, the riskless rate of return
available now on Treasury inﬂation-protected securities (TIPS). The next
nonstochastic simulation (sec. 2.2.3) assumes that PRA annuity payments
partially oﬀset traditional social security beneﬁts, with the traditional
PAYGO beneﬁts reduced by ninety cents for each dollar of PRA annuity.
Finally, we consider (in sec. 2.2.4) the case in which the PAYGO tax rate
remains constant at 12.4 percent and calculate the path of PRA contribu-
tions that can maintain the currently projected beneﬁts; this corresponds
to a system of two-thirds PAYGO beneﬁts and one-third investment-
based beneﬁts.
In section 2.3, we go from a world of certainty to one in which we
recognize the uncertain character of the portfolio return and the volatility
of the corporate proﬁts on the incremental PRA capital. The corporate-
tax collections are important because we use this revenue (in sec. 2.5)
to ﬁnance conditional transfers to retirees that guarantee that retirement
income will be at least as large as it would have been with the traditional
PAYGO beneﬁts implied by current law. Section 2.3 speciﬁes the nature of
the portfolio uncertainty and the capital productivity uncertainty that we
take into account in the remainder of the paper and presents the historical
evidence to parametize this stochastic environment.
In section 2.4, we introduce this uncertainty into the transition process
and examine the implications of diﬀerent PRA saving rates. For each of
the PRA saving rates, we simulate ten thousand time series of beneﬁts
from the year 2000 to the year 2070. We summarize the implications of
the uncertainty by presenting the distribution of these investment-based
annuities (initially mixed with declining PAYGO beneﬁts) relative to the
PAYGO beneﬁts implied by current law (to which we refer as the bench-
mark beneﬁts) in 2010, 2020, 2030, 2050, and 2070.
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come can be completely eliminated by a conditional PAYGO payment that
ﬁlls any gap that may exist between the individual’s PRA annuity and the
basic benchmark beneﬁt. Of course, this shifts the risk from retirees to
concurrent taxpayers, that is, essentially to employees. Section 2.5 ana-
lyzes the extent of taxpayer risk in such an intergenerational guarantee.
Although we believe that the best way to understand the risks associated
with the investment-based plans is to look at the distribution of possible
outcomes, we provide explicit expected-utility-function evaluations in sec-
tion 2.6 for the basic PRA plans with and without government guarantees.
Sections 2.4–2.6 focus on the transition to a system that is completely
investment based, that is, that has completely eliminated any PAYGO com-
ponent. Analyzing this limiting case provides a useful benchmark because
it involves more risk than a mixed system that permanently combines de-
ﬁned beneﬁts ﬁnanced by government revenue with investment-based
PRA annuities.1 But, as a practical matter, the public policy interest in the
United States (as well as in Sweden, Australia, and elsewhere) focuses on
a mixed system that combines PAYGO and investment-based elements. In
section 2.7, we analyze a mixed system in which the PAYGO component
provides in the long run a beneﬁt equal to about two-thirds of the pro-
jected benchmark beneﬁt. We focus on this level of deﬁned beneﬁt because
the PAYGO tax required to pay such a beneﬁt is approximately equal to
the current 12.4 percent payroll tax. Since preventing an increase in the
payroll tax or a decrease in projected beneﬁts is a stated goal of current
U.S. public policy, this is a particularly interesting case to consider.
We begin our analysis of this mixed system in section 2.7 with the as-
sumption that there is no additional guarantee to retirees, that is, that they
are guaranteed to receive the beneﬁts that can be ﬁnanced with a 12.4
percent payroll tax but bear the risk of the uncertain return associated
with the PRA annuities. We then consider the implications of adding a
conditional PAYGO beneﬁt of the type considered in section 2.5.
2.1 The Social Security Simulation Model
Our analysis is based on an extended and updated version of the simple
accounting model developed in Feldstein and Samwick (1997, 1998a,
1998b). The model is now calibrated so that, with the current social secu-
rity rules, it closely approximates the basic time series of beneﬁts, revenues,
and trust fund assets predicted in the 1998 social security trustees report
(Board of Trustees 1998).2
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1. A tax-ﬁnanced deﬁned-beneﬁt plan is of course also subject to the political risk that
beneﬁts will be reduced by legislation (see McHale, chap. 7 in this volume).
2. The earlier papers all used the 1995 social security trustees report and assumed retire-
ment at age sixty-ﬁve. In keeping with current law, we now assume that the “normal retire-The unit of analysis in these simulations is the individual. Beneﬁts for
spouses and survivors, as well as disability beneﬁts, are subsumed in the
individual beneﬁt projections in a way that satisﬁes the aggregate annual
cost projections of the Social Security Administration. We incorporate the
actual current age structure of the population, the Census Bureau projec-
tions of future births through 2050, and the projected cohort-speciﬁc life
tables for individuals born through that year. To reﬂect the net inﬂow of
immigrants, we scale up the projected population at every age to coincide
with the aggregate population projections of the Social Security Admin-
istration.
The simulations simplify by assuming that individuals enter the labor
force at age twenty-one and work until they retire at the normal retirement
age (or until death if that occurs sooner). Since not everyone in the popu-
lation actually works during those years, we adjust the labor force partici-
pation rate to obtain the number of covered workers in each year speciﬁed
in the Social Security Administration projections.
We use the historic data for average taxable earnings in covered employ-
ment in years before 1998, as given in the 1997 Social Security Annual
Statistical Supplement. We follow the intermediate assumption in the 1998
social security trustees report (Board of Trustees 1998) that the average
real wage rises at 0.9 percent per year in the future. The movements in the
average real wage reﬂect the changing age structure of the labor force as
well as the overall rate of increase in age-speciﬁc wages. More speciﬁcally,
on the basis of the pattern of covered earnings by age as reported in the
1997 Social Security Annual Statistical Supplement, we assume that annual
earnings rise at g  3 percent for individuals under age thirty-ﬁve, at g  1
percent for individuals between thirty-ﬁve and forty-ﬁve, and at g  1.5
percent for those over forty-ﬁve, where the value of g for each year is
chosen to make the overall rise in wages equal to the historic record before
1998 and to the projected 0.9 percent annual rise after 1998.
Each individual employee is required to contribute a fraction of each
year’s earnings (up to the current ceiling on taxable earnings) to a PRA.3
In the nonstochastic simulations with which we begin our analysis, the
investments in the PRAs are assumed to earn a real logarithmic rate of
return of 5.5 percent. As we describe in more detail in section 2.3, the
average real log rate of return on a fund invested 60 percent in the Stan-
dard and Poor’s portfolio of common stock and 40 percent in a portfolio
of corporate bonds during the postwar period through 1995 was 5.9 per-
cent.4 We reduce this return by 0.4 percentage points for administrative
ment age” is sixty-ﬁve for individuals born before 1941. Those born in 1941 and later retire
at age sixty-six, while those born in 1958 and later retire at age sixty-seven.
3. The deposit to the PRA could come instead from the individual’s employer or from the
government, a distinction that we do not pursue here.
4. Including the more recent period would increase this rate of return.
44 Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwickcosts to produce a net real log rate of return of 5.5 percent. Although this
mean log rate of return corresponds to an expected money rate of return
of 6.5 percent,5 we make the conservative assumption in this section (since
we are not dealing with risk explicitly) that the real money rate of return
is just 5.5 percent.
At retirement, each individual’s PRA balance is used to purchase a vari-
able annuity that invests in the same sixty-forty mix of stocks and bonds
and therefore has the same 5.5 percent expected real rate of return.6 If an
individual dies before reaching retirement age, the funds in his PRA are
divided among the surviving employees. As we noted above, survivor ben-
eﬁts are implicitly included in the beneﬁt calculations.7
The 5.9 percent real log return before administrative expenses is the
return earned by “untaxed” portfolio investors after the companies have
paid corporate and property taxes to the federal, state, and local govern-
ments. The full rate of return earned on incremental capital before all
taxes during this same period was substantially higher, approximately 8.5
percent (Poterba 1998). We return below to the implications of this for
the taxes collected on incremental capital but not included in the return
earned on PRA accounts.
We follow the social security trustees in assuming that the real return on
the government bonds in the social security trust fund will decline grad-
ually from the current level to a 2.8 percent real interest rate in the future.
This is also a conservative assumption (although not a very important one
given the relative size of the trust fund) because the Treasury inﬂation-
protected securities now provide a real rate of return of 3.7 percent.
Because we are interested in total beneﬁt payments and not in their
distribution by income and family type, we base our calculations on aver-
age taxable earnings in each year and do not distinguish income levels or
family structures. Although we therefore cannot apply the actual social
security beneﬁt rules, we can calculate average beneﬁts under current so-
cial security law by attributing an implicit rate of return on the taxes paid
by individuals in each birth cohort. The cohort-speciﬁc real rates of return
of current and future retirees that we apply to these taxes are modiﬁcations
of earlier estimates by Boskin et al. (1987); their estimates, which were
for single-earner couples, have been adjusted to produce aggregate beneﬁt
amounts that coincide with the trustees’ projections of the beneﬁts implied
by the current law for future years:
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5. With the historic standard deviation of 0.125 and the assumption that the log returns
are normally distributed, the corresponding “level” or “money” rate of return is 6.5 percent;
i.e., if r is the log rate of return, and E(r)  0.055, while the standard deviation of r is 0.125,
normality implies that E[er]  eE [r]0.52  1.065.
6. We describe the nature of variable annuities in detail in sec. 2.3 below.
7. An alternative assumption would be to permit preretirement bequests. Permitting such
bequests reduces the funds available to survivors at retirement by about 14 percent. For
more on this and related aspects of bequests, see Feldstein and Ranguelova (forthcoming).Year of Birth Before 1915 1915 1930 1945 1960 1975 After 1990
Real rate of return (%) 7.0 5.41 2.42 1.62 1.44 1.29 1.08
We linearly interpolate between these values to get cohort-speciﬁc rates of
return for all birth years between 1915 and 1990.
Even with the lower rates of return for younger workers implied by this
procedure, the projected beneﬁts cannot be ﬁnanced by the existing 12.4
percent OASDI tax rate because of the changing age structure of the pop-
ulation. The changing demographics cause the trust fund to be exhausted
in the year 2032. Maintaining the projected beneﬁts implied by current
law (the benchmark beneﬁts) would require raising the PAYGO tax from
12.4 to nearly 19 percent in the long run. The rapid aging of the popula-
tion associated with the baby-boom generation would raise the tax rate
required to fund concurrent beneﬁts to more than 17 percent by the year
2035.
2.2 A Nonstochastic Transition from PAYGO
to Investment-Based Pensions
In this section, we begin by describing a feasible path from the existing
PAYGO tax-supported system to a system that is eventually fully invest-
ment based and receives no tax support. During the transition, this re-
quires a combination of PAYGO taxes and PRA saving deposits. We show
that the transition can be achieved with an initial PRA saving deposit of
3 percent of earnings (up to the social security taxable maximum), bring-
ingthecombinationofpayrolltaxesandPRAsavingto15.4percentoftax-
able earnings. This combined amount eventually declines as the PRA an-
nuities reduce the need for the PAYGO beneﬁts. This decline occurs even
though the aging of the population would require a rapidly rising payroll-
tax rate if the pure tax-ﬁnanced system continued. By the year 2070, the
investment-based system can produce the “benchmark” level of beneﬁts
with a 4.25 percent PRA saving rate instead of the 18.7 percent payroll
tax that would be required in a PAYGO system. This low PRA saving
rate could continue for the indeﬁnite future if the basic demographic and
economic characteristics of the economy remained unchanged at the levels
that they reached in 2070; improvements in mortality after that time
would, however, require increases in the PRA saving rate.
There are a variety of diﬀerent possible transitions that can take the
system from where it is today to a fully investment-based system. The path
that we analyze constrains the total retirement beneﬁts in each year—that
is, the sum of the traditional PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity—to
be at least as large as the benchmark beneﬁts implied for future years by
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beneﬁts are being paid, the sum of the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annu-
ity is constrained to be exactly equal to the benchmark beneﬁt. When the
PAYGO beneﬁt becomes zero, the PRA annuities may exceed the bench-
mark beneﬁt (because the excess cannot be oﬀset by reducing the PAYGO
beneﬁt further). The trust fund is constrained to remain positive in every
year. In order to allow the PAYGO taxes to adjust smoothly, we do not
impose requirements on the path of the trust fund other than that it re-
main positive.
The transition is assumed to begin in the year 2000. In that year, all
employees from age twenty-one through age sixty-four deposit 3 percent
of their wages up to the maximum taxable earnings (or have it deposited
by employers or the government). The funds in the PRA account receive
a 5.5 percent real rate of return. In the next year (2001), those who turn
sixty-ﬁve and retire receive a very small PRA annuity.9 Because of the
small PRA annuity, the total retirement beneﬁt of these new retirees (i.e.,
the sum of the regular PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity) can be main-
tained at its benchmark level with a smaller PAYGO beneﬁt. This permits
the payroll tax to be reduced slightly while maintaining the initial path of
the trust fund. In each successive year, the number of retirees with PRA
annuities increases, and the average total value of their annuities increases
because the retirees have had more years in which to accumulate PRA
balances. The required PAYGO beneﬁts and associated taxes therefore de-
crease over time. This reduction in the PAYGO tax permits the mandatory
PRA saving rate to be increased without raising the combined burden of
the two.
We can summarize the growth equation for the PRA balance as
(1) ANN As As s Ws s () . ( ) () () () , =⋅ − + ⋅− 1 055 1 
whereas A(s) is the value of the PRA balance, the 1.055 growth factor
reﬂects the real rate of return (0.055), (s) is the saving rate at time s,
W(s) is the wage income at time s, and ANN(s) is the annuity withdrawal
at time s.
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of the transition process. All the ﬁgures
in rows 1–10 are expressed as percentages of taxable earnings (i.e., earn-
When Portfolio Returns and Capital Proﬁtability Are Uncertain 47
8. We emphasize that at this point our analysis is nonstochastic. We are really constraining
the sum of the PAYGO beneﬁt and the nonstochastic PRA annuity to be at least as large as
the benchmark beneﬁt.
9. As a practical matter, the annuity beneﬁts after just one year of PRA contribution
would be so small relative to the administrative costs that it would be more sensible to ex-
clude everyone over some age (say ﬁfty-ﬁve) from participating in the transition or to allow
them to receive their accumulated PRA balances at retirement as a lump sum with no reduc-
tion in their regular social security beneﬁts. To simplify the description and analysis, we do
not make either modiﬁcation.ings up to the maximum amount taxed by social security); aggregate tax-
able earnings in billions of 1998 dollars are shown in row 11.
Row 1 shows the tax rate implied by the current unfunded system. We
assume that the social security payroll-tax rate would remain at its current
12.4 percent level until it becomes necessary to raise the tax rate in order
to pay the benchmark level of beneﬁts (shown in row 2 as a percentage of
taxable earnings). In the early years, the tax at the current 12.4 percent is
more than the amount needed to pay the benchmark beneﬁts, and the
original trust fund grows. But, after a relatively few years, the beneﬁts ex-
ceedthe revenueraisedbya 12.4percenttax.In 2020,forexample, theben-
eﬁts are14.5 percent of taxableearnings, requiring a transferfrom the trust
fund balance to make up the 2.1 percent of taxable earnings diﬀerence
between the beneﬁts and the tax collections.10
The trust fund initially grows because payroll-tax receipts exceed beneﬁt
payments. It continues to grow brieﬂy even when beneﬁts exceed taxes be-
cause of the interest earned on its assets and the inﬂow of the tax on social
security beneﬁts that the Treasury transfers to the trust fund. But, even
with this supplementary income, the trust fund is exhausted by 2032. This
is shown in row 3. At this point, the tax rate in row 1 is raised to be equal
to the beneﬁts in row 2. By 2070, the required tax in the pure PAYGO sys-
tem is 18.7 percent of taxable earnings; since these earnings are approx-
imately 36 percent of GDP in that year, this corresponds to 7.4 percent
of GDP.
Row 4 shows the PRA saving deposits, also expressed as a percentage
Table 2.1 Transition Path of Tax Rates, PRA Contributions, and Annuities (all ﬁgures are
expressed as % of taxable earnings)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
1. Tax rate with PAYGO system 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 17.29 18.70
2. Benchmark beneﬁts 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.16 18.55
3. Trust fund with PAYGO system 25.46 40.95 39.57 6.66 0.00 0.00
4. PRA saving deposits 3.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25
5. PRA annuities 0.00 0.20 1.35 4.05 13.02 19.80
6. PAYGO tax rate in transition 12.40 11.15 11.15 11.15 5.65 0.00
7. PAYGO tax rate  PRA
saving rate 15.40 15.40 15.40 15.40 9.90 4.25
8. PAYGO beneﬁts  PRA
annuities 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.51 20.00
9. Trust fund 25.46 36.55 28.49 8.13 18.88 3.03
10. PRA asset balances 3.00 44.75 111.09 191.47 329.71 367.77
11. Covered earnings in billions
of 1998 dollars 3,528.24 4,096.18 4,610.91 5,077.32 6,287.71 7,634.87
48 Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwick
10. The transfer from the trust fund requires the trust fund to sell bonds to the public,
increasing the uniﬁed budget deﬁcit or reducing the uniﬁed budget surplus.of taxable earnings (up to the maximum taxable earnings limit). These
deposits start at 3.0 percent of taxable earnings for the ﬁrst seven years
(2000–2006) and then jump to 4.25 percent of taxable earnings in 2007,
the level at which they remain. As successive birth cohorts reach retire-
ment age, they receive PRA annuities. These annuities, shown in row 5,
rise rapidly as the number of retired cohorts increases and as the PRA an-
nuitypercohortrisesinrecognitionofthegreaternumberofyearsthateach
successive cohort had been contributing to the PRA accounts. The PRA
annuities rise from 1.3 percent of taxable earnings in 2020 to 4.1 percent
of taxable earnings in 2030, 13.0 percent of taxable earnings in 2050,
and 19.8 percent of taxable earnings in 2070.
The PAYGO beneﬁts are reduced dollar for dollar in response to the
rising PRA annuities in a way that keeps the sum equal to the original
benchmark beneﬁts as long as PAYGO beneﬁts are positive. This permits
the PAYGO tax rate to be reduced. The path of the PAYGO tax during
the transition is shown in row 6. The initial 12.4 percent tax rate is reduced
in 2010 to 11.15 percent and remains at this level until 2039. It is then
reduced by 0.5 percent of taxable earnings each year until it reaches 5.15
percent of taxable earnings in 2051. After that, it declines at 1 percent of
taxable earnings per year until it is 0.15 percent of taxable earnings in 2056
and zero thereafter. After that, the income of the trust fund is suﬃcient to
ﬁnance the remaining PAYGO obligations.
The combined PAYGO tax and the PRA deposit rate is shown in row
7. In the beginning of the transition, the combination rises from the cur-
rent 12.4 percent PAYGO tax to 15.4 percent. It remains at this level in
2007, when the PAYGO tax is cut to 11.15 percent at the same time that
the PRA deposit rate increases from 3.0 to 4.25 percent. Since the PRA
saving rate remains permanently at 4.25 percent, the combined total be-
gins to fall in 2040, when the PAYGO tax rate begins to decline. In 2045,
the PAYGO tax is down to 8.15 percent, bringing the combined total back
down to 12.40 percent of taxable earnings, the initial PAYGO tax. In con-
trast, the pure PAYGO system would require a 17.27 percent tax in that
year to support the same level of beneﬁts. While the pure PAYGO tax rate
would rise after that year, the combined PAYGO and PRA rate falls from
12.4 percent in 2045 to 9.9 percent in 2050 and to 4.25 percent in 2057
and all subsequent years.
After the PAYGO tax rate has been reduced to zero (in 2057), further
increases in the PRA annuities are reﬂected in a higher level of total bene-
ﬁts (the sum of the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity, shown in row
8). By 2070, the ratio of the PRA beneﬁt to the benchmark beneﬁt (shown
in row 2) is 1.07.
The accumulated PRA assets are shown in row 9. This rises from 45
percent of taxable earnings in 2010 to 3.7 times taxable earnings in the
year 2070. As a percentage of GDP, this represents a rise from about 18
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stock is about three times GDP, this can also be expressed as a 6 percent
rise in the capital stock after ten years and a 50 percent rise in the capital
stock after seventy years.11
For information, we show in row 10 the level of the government social
security trust fund. This could, of course, be eliminated completely once
the PAYGO beneﬁts become zero.
Finally, row 11 shows the covered taxable earnings, expressed in 1998
dollars.
2.2.1 Incremental Corporate-Tax Revenue
and Supplemental Saving Deposits
The calculations summarized in table 2.1 assume that the real rate of
return on PRA saving is 5.5 percent. Although this has been the historic
mean log return to “nontaxable” portfolio investors on the sixty-forty
portfolio investment (net of the assumed 0.40 percentage point adminis-
trative cost), it is substantially less than the real pretax marginal rate of
return on additions to the corporate capital stock. The primary reason for
the diﬀerence is the taxes collected by federal, state, and local govern-
ments.
The national income and product account data analyzed by Poterba
(1998) imply that, during the years 1959–96, the real pretax marginal
product of capital in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector was 8.5 percent.
Of this, Poterba estimates that the federal government collected 2.2 per-
centage points in corporate proﬁt taxes (an eﬀective tax rate of 26 per-
cent).12 State and local governments took an additional 0.3 percentage
points in proﬁts taxes and 0.9 percentage points in property taxes. These
taxes imply that the net return to portfolio investors during those years
would be 5.1 percent. Although this is substantially less than the return
to the sixty-forty stock-bond portfolio that we discussed above, it is the
same as the mean-level return of that stock-bond portfolio for the years
of the Poterba sample. This suggests that the Poterba sample of years may
have had a lower than normal rate of proﬁtability for the postwar period
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11. The large long-run rise in the capital stock would have general equilibrium eﬀects on
the marginal product of capital and on real wages that we do not take into account here. A
Cobb-Douglas technology, an unchanged path of human capital, the absence of interna-
tional capital ﬂows, and a 25 percent capital share imply that the marginal product of capital
would decline in the very long run by about 25 percent (e.g., from 8.5 to 6.4 percent). This
decline would be oﬀset to the extent that the lower marginal tax rates induced a higher labor
supply and the lower interest rate induced a greater investment in human capital. We do not
pursue such general equilibrium eﬀects here.
12. A 26 percent eﬀective tax rate is substantially less than the statutory corporate-proﬁts-
tax rate, which is now 35 percent and which has had a higher average during the sample
years. The diﬀerence reﬂects the deduction of state and local property and income taxes in
the calculation of federal tax liability and the combination of depreciation allowances and
interest deductions.as a whole. We will nevertheless make the conservative estimate of a fed-
eral corporate-tax collection equal to 2.0 percent of the incremental capi-
tal stock.
There are three potential uses of this additional corporate-tax revenue.
The most direct is to use it to ﬁnance a portion of the PRA saving deposits
instead of requiring individuals and/or their employers to pay for this or
using other government revenue for this purpose. A second alternative is
to supplement the 5.5 percent return, raising it to 7.5 percent. Finally, in
section 2.5, after the stochastic simulations have been introduced, we show
how the additional corporate-tax revenue can be used to ﬁnance a beneﬁt
guarantee to retirees.
Since we take the incremental corporate-tax revenue to be 2 percent of
the incremental corporate stock, we must estimate the increase in the na-
tional corporate capital stock that results from the PRAs. In principle,
this requires looking beyond the PRA program itself to see how the PRA
accounts might alter other private saving, something that would change
over time. In the early years of the PRA program, disposable income
would decline, giving individuals an incentive to reduce other saving in
order to maintain a more level time path of consumption. The quantitative
importance of this is, however, likely to be small since the vast majority
of Americans have too little in ﬁnancial assets to do any such oﬀsetting
reductions. Moreover, some individuals might be stimulated by participat-
ing in the PRA program to recognize the value of saving and therefore to
increase their other saving. As the PRA system matures, the reduction in
the combined total of the payroll tax and the PRA deposits (shown as the
diﬀerence between row 1 and row 7 of table 2.1) would raise disposable
income during working years with virtually no change in retirement in-
comes, inducing individuals to save more during their working years in
order to smooth consumption over time. That increase in saving would
make national saving rise. In our calculations, we ignore such possible
changes in individual consumption and saving and assume that the na-
tion’s capital stock increases by the net inﬂows to the PRA accounts plus
the PRA capital income (interest, dividends, and retained earnings) of
those accounts.
In the current nonstochastic model, this growth of the incremental capi-
tal stock should be well measured by the market value of the PRA assets.13
The aggregate value of the assets in the PRA accounts grows initially be-
cause the PRA deposits exceed the annuity withdrawals. But, after the
early years, the primary source of the increase in the PRA asset value is
the 5.5 percent return that is earned on the net assets in the PRA accounts,
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13. In the next section, where we explicitly consider ﬂuctuations in asset market values,
we distinguish between the two and model the evolution of the incremental capital stock ex-
plicitly.and the annuity payments eventually exceed the savings deposits. This is
shown in rows 4 and 5 of table 2.1.
Using 2 percent of the incremental capital stock (i.e., the assumed addi-
tional federal corporate-tax receipts) to ﬁnance a portion of the PRA sav-
ing deposits, instead of requiring individuals and/or their employers to
pay for this or using other government revenue for this purpose, has a
small eﬀect in the early years but a very substantial eﬀect in the more
distant future.14 In 2010, the incremental corporate-tax revenue would be
about $36 billion (at 1998 prices), or 0.9 percent of taxable earnings, per-
mitting the additional PRA deposits to be reduced from 4.25 to 3.35 per-
cent of taxable earnings.15 But, by 2030, the incremental corporate tax
revenue would be 3.83 percent of taxable earnings and would permit re-
ducing the additional PRA deposit to 0.42 percent of taxable earnings,
bringing the total from 15.5 to 11.67 percent of taxable earnings, less than
the current pure PAYGO tax rate of 12.4 percent. In 2050, 2 percent of
the incremental capital stock would be 6.60 percent of taxable earnings,
more than enough to pay for all the 4.25 percent PRA deposit and to
permit the PAYGO tax to be reduced from 5.65 to 4.30 percent. Eventu-
ally, in 2070, the incremental revenue would be 7.35 percent of taxable
earnings; since there is no longer a PAYGO tax at that time and the PRA
deposits are only 4.25 percent of taxable earnings, the extra corporate-tax
revenue would ﬁnance the PRA program and leave 3.1 percent of taxable
earnings for other uses.
We now consider the implication of an alternative use of these incre-
mental corporate-tax funds: using this additional federal corporate-tax
collection to supplement the return earned in the PRAs. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that this additional corporate-tax revenue is divided among the
PRA accounts in proportion to the asset value of those accounts. This
raises the return on the assets in the PRA accounts from 5.5 to 7.5 percent,
changing equation (1) to
(2) ANN As As s Ws s () . ( ) () () () , =⋅ − + ⋅− 1 075 1 
where A(s) is the value of the PRA balance, the 1.075 growth factor re-
ﬂects the real rate of return, (s) is the PRA saving rate at time s, W(s)i s
the wage income at time s, and ANN(s) is the annuity withdrawal at time s.
The higher rate of return permits lower PRA saving rates to be consis-
tent with the requirements that the benchmark beneﬁts be ﬁnanced, the
trust fund remain solvent, and the PRA annuities eventually fully replace
PAYGO beneﬁts. Our calculations show that this can be satisﬁed with a
constant 2.1 percent PRA deposit rate. The PAYGO tax drops from 12.40
to 11.40 percent in 2020 and stays at that level until 2028, when it drops
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14. This is the approach used by Feldstein and Samwick (1998a).
15. These ﬁgures and others cited in this paragraph can be derived from row 10 of table 2.1.by 1.1 percent to 10.3 percent. In 2028, the sum of the PAYGO tax rate
and the PRA deposit rate is back to 12.40 percent. The PAYGO tax rate
stays at 10.3 percent until 2040, when it gets phased out at a rate of 0.5
percent per year. The PAYGO tax is therefore gone by 2060, and the only
cost is the 2.1 percent PRA deposit.
These results are summarized in table 2.2, which follows the same for-
mat as table 2.1. The ﬁrst three rows of table 2.2 are the same as in table
2.1. The PRA saving deposits in row 4 are substantially smaller, but the
PRA annuities are larger after 2045. The combined PAYGO tax rate and
PRA saving deposit is lower than 12.4 percent.
2.2.2 Implications of a Risk-Free Investment
Since we are ignoring risk at this point in our analysis, it is sensible to
consider what a transition path might look like if the rate of return is re-
duced from the 5.5 percent mean real return on a debt-equity portfolio to
the real return available on inﬂation-protected U.S. Treasury bonds, that
is, the Treasury inﬂation-protected securities (TIPS). Such investments
have no default risk and no risk of inﬂation erosion. For an investor who
holds them to maturity, there is no market risk due to interest-rate ﬂuc-
tuations. Since the TIPS currently have a 3.7 percent real yield at a vari-
ety of maturities, we use that rate of return in these risk-free-return calcu-
lations.
Achieving a transition to a completely investment-based system with
this lower real rate of return requires starting with a higher PRA saving
Table 2.2 Transition Path with Supplementary Savings Deposits (all ﬁgures are expressed as
% of taxable earnings)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
1. Tax rate with PAYGO system 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 17.29 18.70
2. Benchmark beneﬁts 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.16 18.55
3. Trust fund with PAYGO system 25.46 40.95 39.57 6.66 0.00 0.00
4. PRA saving deposits 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10
5. PRA annuities 0.00 0.16 1.11 3.58 13.41 20.06
6. PAYGO tax rate in transition 12.40 12.40 11.40 10.30 4.80 0.00
7. PAYGO tax rate  PRA
saving rate 14.50 14.50 13.50 12.40 6.90 2.10
8. PAYGO beneﬁts  PRA
annuities 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.95 20.23
9. Trust fund 25.46 41.52 45.42 23.67 15.36 6.60
10. PRA asset balances 2.10 30.53 76.29 140.10 264.68 297.42
11. Covered earnings in billions
of 1998 dollars 3,528.24 4,096.18 4,610.91 5,077.32 6,287.71 7,634.87
Note: The supplementary saving deposits are equal to 2.0 percent of the PRA asset balances and
eﬀectively raise the rate of return from 5.5 to 7.5 percent.
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rates of return. A feasible solution begins with a PRA saving rate of 5.0
percent (instead of the 3.0 percent in table 2.1) and gradually increases
this to 8.0 percent while reducing the PAYGO tax rate. The speciﬁc path
is summarized in table 2.3, which follows the same format as tables 2.1
and 2.2.
The PAYGO tax rate declines from the initial 12.4 percent to 11.4 per-
cent in 2010, 10.40 percent in 2030, 9.40 percent in 2050, and zero after
2061. The combined PAYGO tax rate and PRA saving deposit (row 7)
therefore remain at 17.4 percent until after 2050 but decline to 8.00 per-
cent permanently by 2070.
Thus, even with a risk-free rate of return of only 3.7 percent, the
investment-based system can support the benchmark level of beneﬁts with
a long-run saving rate of only 8.0 percent instead of the PAYGO tax rate
of 18.7 percent. Even in this least-favorable case of maximum risk aver-
sion, the investment-based approach permits usinga5p e r c e n thigher sav-
ing plus tax rate in the transition years in order to reduce the equilibrium
saving plus tax rate permanently by more than 10 percent of covered
earnings.
An individual who is prepared to accept some risk of lower beneﬁts in
retirement can achieve the same expected beneﬁts with a substantially
lower long-term saving rate. Before examining that possibility, we consider
the implications of a partial integration of the PRA annuities and social
security beneﬁts.
Table 2.3 Transition Path with 3.7 Percent Risk-Free Rate of Return (all ﬁgures are
expressed as % of taxable earnings)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
1. Tax rate with PAYGO system 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 17.29 18.70
2. Benchmark beneﬁts 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.16 18.55
3. Trust fund with PAYGO system 25.46 40.95 39.57 6.66 0.00 0.00
4. PRA saving deposits 5.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 8.00
5. PRA annuities 0.00 0.25 1.51 4.05 11.08 17.42
6. PAYGO tax rate in transition 12.40 11.40 11.40 10.40 9.40 0.00
7. PAYGO tax rate  PRA
saving rate 17.40 17.40 17.40 17.40 17.40 8.00
8. PAYGO beneﬁts  PRA
annuities 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.16 18.61
9. Trust fund 25.46 40.87 37.49 21.87 18.79 22.43
10. PRA asset balances 5.00 61.22 136.28 215.06 366.24 440.32
11. Covered earnings in billions
of 1998 dollars 3,528.24 4,096.18 4,610.91 5,077.32 6,287.71 7,634.87
Note: The 3.7 percent real rate of return implicit in these calculations is the present yield on Treasury
inﬂation-protected securities of varying maturities.
54 Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwick2.2.3 Partial Integration of PRA Annuities and Social Security Beneﬁts
In the transitions shown in tables 2.1–2.3, the traditional PAYGO social
security beneﬁts were eﬀectively reduced by a dollar for every dollar of
PRA annuity that individuals received. An alternative integration rule for
integrating social security PAYGO beneﬁts and the PRA annuities that
might be preferred when uncertainty is recognized (and therefore when
individuals have some choice about their investments) reduces regular so-
cial security beneﬁts by less than one dollar for every dollar of annuity
income.16 When the PRA annuities are uncertain, this partial integration
reduces the risk to retirees by making the PAYGO beneﬁts more when the
PRA annuities are smaller.17
We now study such a partial integration plan in the nonstochastic con-
text to provide a framework for understanding the subsequent stochastic
results. We use a 90 percent integration rule that provides that the regular
PAYGO beneﬁts are reduced by ninety cents for every dollar of PRA an-
nuity.18 We again assume a 5.5 percent rate of return and make no allow-
ance for the possible use of the incremental corporate-tax revenue. This
option provides substantially higher beneﬁts to retirees and therefore re-
duces the cost of the PAYGO program by less than the analysis shown in
table 2.1.
With the assumed 5.5 percent real rate of return, it is therefore neces-
sary to have higher PRA deposits than with the dollar-for-dollar integra-
tion rule of table 2.1. There are again many possibilities. We constrain the
choice by imposing the requirement that the combined PAYGO tax and
PRA deposit not rise by more than 3 percent of taxable earnings, that is,
that the combined amount not exceed 15.4 percent of taxable earnings.
With that condition, a feasible path begins with a 3 percent PRA deposit
from 2000 to 2019, rising to 4 percent from 2020 to 2032, and then to 5
percent after that. Table 2.4 presents the transition paths of the basic vari-
ables for this case.
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16. Alternatively, the simulations that we have already discussed could be thought of as
providing a ﬁxed level of PAYGO beneﬁts in each year with individuals receiving the uncer-
tain PRA annuities as a supplement with the PAYGO beneﬁt levels selected so that, with the
expected return, the two provide the benchmark beneﬁts.
17. Feldstein and Samwick (1998a) analyzed a plan in which the PRA contributions equal
to 2 percent of taxable earnings are ﬁnanced by the government (rather than by mandatory
saving) and each dollar of annuity that retirees receive reduces their regular social security
beneﬁts by seventy-ﬁve cents. That analysis showed that PRA deposits equal to 2 percent of
covered earnings and a 5.5 percent real rate of return would permit the projected level of
benchmark beneﬁts to be paid indeﬁnitely with no increase in the existing 12.4 percent
PAYGO taxable-earnings tax. Moreover, by the year 2030, the corporate-tax revenue gener-
ated by the incremental capital would be enough to ﬁnance fully the PRA deposits equal to
2 percent of covered earnings.
18. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as reducing the PRA annuity by 90 percent as
long as that reduction does not exceed the value of the PAYGO beneﬁts.2.2.4 A Mixed System with a Permanent 12.4 Percent Earnings Tax
and a 75 Percent Integration Rule
We now consider the more realistic case of a mixed system that provides
retirement income through a combination of PAYGO tax-ﬁnanced bene-
ﬁts and individual investment-based annuities. We ﬁx the PAYGO tax rate
at its current 12.4 percent level and leave it there for all future years.
We also have a constant rate of saving in the PRA accounts equal to
2.3 percent of covered earnings. We follow a 75 percent integration rule
in which the traditional social security beneﬁts in each year are reduced
by 75 percent of the PRA annuity. Stated diﬀerently, 75 percent of the
PRA annuity is paid to the Social Security Administration to help defray
the cost of the social security annuities. The combination of the (net)
PAYGO beneﬁt and the (net) PRA annuity is therefore equal to the bench-
mark social security beneﬁt plus 25 percent of the PRA annuity. The bal-
ance in the social security trust fund adjusts to reﬂect the diﬀerence be-
tween the beneﬁts paid and the combination of the 12.4 percent payroll-
tax revenue and the 75 percent of the PRA annuity.
These results are shown in the standard format in table 2.5. Rows 4 and
5 describe the simple combination of the 12.4 percent PAYGO tax and the
2.3 percent PRA deposit rate. Row 6 shows the gross PRA annuities (i.e.,
before any allowance for the 75 percent integration eﬀect) that would re-
sult from the 2.3 percent PRA deposits. These annuities are less than 1
percent of covered earnings in 2020 but rise to 2.54 percent in 2030, 7.65
percent in 2050, and 10.75 percent in 2070.
Individuals receive the sum of their promised benchmark beneﬁts (row
Table 2.4 Transition Path with 90 Percent Integration Rule (all ﬁgures are expressed as % of
taxable earnings)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
1. Tax rate with PAYGO system 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 17.29 18.70
2. Benchmark beneﬁts 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.16 18.55
3. Trust fund with PAYGO system 25.46 40.95 39.57 6.66 0.00 0.00
4. PRA saving deposits 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
5. PRA annuities 0.00 0.19 1.16 3.40 11.30 19.66
6. PAYGO tax rate in transition 12.40 12.40 11.40 11.40 8.90 0.00
7. PAYGO tax rate  PRA
saving rate 15.40 15.40 15.40 15.40 13.90 5.00
8. PAYGO beneﬁts  PRA
annuities 10.96 11.74 14.62 17.49 18.29 20.92
9. Trust fund 25.46 41.55 45.28 24.16 12.92 12.77
10. PRA asset balances 3.00 39.48 89.85 160.56 315.31 405.71
11. Covered earnings in billions
of 1998 dollars 3,528.24 4,096.18 4,610.91 5,077.32 6,287.71 7,634.87
Note: The 90 percent integration rule provides that each individual receives a PAYGO beneﬁt equal to
the benchmark level minus 90 percent of the individual’s PRA annuity.
56 Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwick2) and 25 percent of these gross PRA annuities. Equivalently, the individu-
als receive the entire gross PRA annuities plus the benchmark beneﬁts
reduced by 75 percent of those annuities. The combined sum is shown in
row 8. In the early years of the transition, the combined total is only
slightly greater than the benchmark beneﬁts. But, by 2050, the beneﬁts are
increased by nearly 2 percent of earnings, an 11 percent rise in total bene-
ﬁts. By 2070, the combined beneﬁts are equal to 21.24 percent of earnings,
or 15 percent higher than they would be under the pure PAYGO system.
The partially investment-based character of this system makes the bene-
ﬁt increase possible despite the fact that the combination of the PAYGO
tax rate and the PRA saving rate is limited to 14.7 percent instead of rising
to the 18.70 percent rate required in the pure PAYGO system.
The social security trust fund (row 9) remains positive throughout the
seventy-year simulation period. The value of the trust fund remains higher
because the PRA beneﬁts reduce the need for PAYGO beneﬁts. Although
the trust fund drops to a low of less than 1 percent of covered earnings in
2046, it then recovers to 3.13 percent of covered earnings in 2050 and
42.74 percent of covered earnings in 2070.
2.3 Uncertain Returns to Portfolio Investments
and to the Incremental Capital Stock
A primary concern in any analysis of the desirability of shifting from
a tax-ﬁnanced deﬁned-beneﬁt plan to an investment-based deﬁned-
contribution plan is the inherent uncertainty of the returns earned on
portfolio investments. This uncertainty aﬀects the accumulation during
Table 2.5 Transition Path with Mixed PAYGO and Investment-Based System: 12.4 Percent
PAYGO Tax, 2.3 Percent PRA Deposits, and 75 Percent Beneﬁt Integration
(all ﬁgures are expressed as % of taxable earnings)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
1. Tax rate with PAYGO system 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 17.29 18.70
2. Benchmark beneﬁts 10.96 11.72 14.50 17.14 17.16 18.55
3. Trust fund with PAYGO system 25.46 40.95 39.57 6.66 0.00 0.00
4. PRA saving deposits 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30
5. PRA annuities (Gross) 0.00 0.14 0.89 2.54 7.65 10.75
6. PAYGO tax rate in transition 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40
7. PAYGO tax rate  PRA
saving rate 14.70 14.70 14.70 14.70 14.70 14.70
8. PAYGO beneﬁts  PRA
annuities 10.96 11.76 14.72 17.78 19.07 21.24
9. Trust fund 25.45 41.33 43.85 25.31 3.13 42.74
10. PRA asset balances 2.30 30.27 63.30 112.82 183.58 199.92
11. Covered earnings in billions
of 1998 dollars 3,528.24 4,096.18 4,610.91 5,077.32 6,287.71 7,634.87
When Portfolio Returns and Capital Proﬁtability Are Uncertain 57the preretirement years as well as the return on the variable annuity that
we assume is used in the postretirement years.
In addition to this portfolio uncertainty, there is also uncertainty about
the amount of corporate-tax revenue that the government would collect on
the incremental capital that results from the PRA saving. This is particu-
larly relevant if that tax revenue is used to supplement or ﬁnance contribu-
tions to PRAs or to ﬁnance a government guarantee of minimum beneﬁts.
This section describes the stochastic properties of these two sources of
uncertainty that we incorporate in the analysis that follows in the rest of
the paper. There are of course other sources of uncertainty that aﬀect both
tax-ﬁnanced plans and investment-based plans that we do not explore
here, including uncertain mortality rates,19 birth- and immigration rates,
and shifts in employment and wage rates.
2.3.1 The Uncertain Investment Return
Our analysis assumes that each individual deposits a speciﬁed fraction
of each year’s taxable wage income in a PRA and that the funds in that
account are invested in a portfolio that is continually rebalanced to main-
tain 60 percent equities and 40 percent debt, approximately the debt-
equity ratio of U.S. corporations.20 At retirement, these accumulated assets
are used to ﬁnance a variable annuity that we assume is invested in the
same stock-bond mixture as the PRA balances were during the preretire-
ment years.
Before looking at the stochastic speciﬁcation of the portfolio returns,
we describe the nature of the variable annuity. The annuity beneﬁt that is
paid in the ﬁrst year of retirement, age sixty-seven (on an annuity pur-
chased at age sixty-six), reﬂects the PRA assets at the beginning of the
individual’s sixty-sixth year, the expected mortality rates at all future ages,
and the assumption that the future return will be equal to the constant
expected rate of return. The annual beneﬁts are then adjusted each year
to reﬂect changes in the value of the annuity account that result from the
diﬀerence between the realized and the expected rate of return.
More speciﬁcally, after one year, the size of the variable-annuity pay-
ment is increased or decreased from the initial value in proportion to the
change in the market value of the PRA annuity assets relative to the mar-
ket value that would have prevailed had the expected rate of return actu-
ally occurred. A similar revision of the annual annuity payment occurs in
each subsequent year.
To derive the explicit value of the variable annuity, consider the individ-
uals in a particular birth cohort. Let the time index coincide with the age
of the cohort so that Nt is the number of individuals alive at age t. Let A66
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19. We use expected mortality rates in our calculations but do not take into account the
uncertainty or instability of those rates.
20. The analysis in this section draws on Feldstein and Ranguelova (forthcoming).be the value of the PRA assets at the beginning of the sixty-sixth year, and
let R be the expected annual real rate of return on the portfolio of assets
used to ﬁnance the retirement annuity. The ﬁrst annuity beneﬁt is paid at
the beginning of the individual’s sixty-seventh year and annually thereaf-
ter. The cost at age sixty-six of a ﬁxed real annuity of $1 for life (i.e., an
annuity that starts with $1 and grows in proportion to the level of con-
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where we assume that all individuals alive at age ninety-nine die at the end
of the one hundredth year.
Since the PRA account has assets equal to A66 when the annuity is estab-
lished, the annuity payment that the individual would receive in the sixty-
seventh year is a67  A66/APV if the expected return of R is actually real-
ized in the sixty-sixth year. More generally, if the expected return of R is
realized in every future year, the individual would continue to receive that
same annuity, and the accumulated assets at age sixty-six of all members
of that birth cohort would be exhausted when the last member of the
cohort dies at age one hundred.
In practice, of course, the actual rate of return varies from year to year.
The annuity payments are adjusted in proportion to the annual changes
in the asset value in such a way that the birth cohort’s accumulated fund
is still exhausted over the thirty-four-year retirement period. If Rt is the
actual rate of increase of the asset value during year t, the asset value at
the beginning of the cohort’s sixty-seventh year is A67  A66(1 R66). The
annuity paid in that year is therefore a67  (A66/APV)(1  R66)/(1  R).
Similarly, the annuity at age sixty-eight reﬂects the changes in the market
value of the assets during the sixty-sixth and sixty-seventh years: a68 
a67(1  R67)/(1  R)  (A66/APV)[(1  R67)/(1  R)][(1  R66)/(1 
R)]. The last payment to those who are one hundred years old is a100 
a99(1  R99)/(1  R). Note that, if the rate of return in each period is
equal to the expected rate of return, the annuity remains constant at a67.
Consider now the stochastic speciﬁcation of the return, Rt, on the PRA
assets and on the assets used to fund the variable annuity. Recall that the
portfolio is 60 percent equity and 40 percent debt. We use the S&P500
index and a Salomon Brothers corporate bond index as proxies for the
stock and bond investments. Both indices are assumed to follow a geomet-
ric random walk with drift. This implies that the log returns for each type
of asset are serially independent and identically distributed with given
mean and variance. Thus, if pe(s) and pb(s) are the log levels of the equity
and bond indices, respectively, at time s, we assume
(4) ps ps us ee e e () ( ) () =− + + 1 	
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where ue ~ i.i.d. N(0, 2
e) and ub ~ i.i.d. N(0, 2
b). The covariance between
the stock and the bond returns is eb.
With a continuously compounded sixty-forty equity-debt portfolio, the
log level of the overall portfolio would satisfy the following random walk
if there were no additions or payments:21
(6) ps ps us () ( ) () , =− + + 1 	
with u ~ i.i.d. N(0,2). To derive the values of 	 and 2, we use the lognor-
mal property of the returns.
More speciﬁcally, if 	* i is the mean return on asset i in level form, the
mean return on the sixty-forty portfolio is the weighted average 	*  0.6
	* e  0.4	* b . Because we assume the log returns to be normally distrib-
uted, 	* i 	 i  0.5 2
i. This implies that
(7) 	  	 	 + =+++ 05 06 05 04 05
22 2 . . (. ) . (. ) , ee bb
where
(8) 
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From these two equations and the mean and variance of the log returns
on stocks and bonds, we can derive the log return on the portfolio and the
variance of that return.
The CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) data for the postwar
period from 1946 through 1995 imply that, for stocks and bonds, the mean
real log rates of return were, respectively, 7.1 and 3.3 percent.22 The corre-
sponding standard deviations were 16.6 percent for stocks and 10.4 per-
cent for bonds. The covariance of the stock and bond returns was eb 
0.0081. Taken together, these parameters imply a log average rate of return
on the sixty-forty portfolio of 5.9 percent with a standard deviation of
12.5 percent.23 We reduce the mean log return from 5.9 to 5.5 percent to
reﬂect potential administrative costs.24
In the analysis that follows, we recognize that the adjusted mean real
log return of 5.5 percent for the portfolio during the period 1946–95 is
only an estimate of the relevant mean for future years. Our stochastic
21. The value of the PRA portfolio during the preretirement years is also increased by the
individual’s annual PRA savings.
22. The bond rate of return is based on the Salomon Brothers AAA bond returns adjusted
to a more typical corporate bond yield by adding 2 percentage points.
23. The portfolio return changes very little if we use the longer time period 1926–95.
24. This estimate of the administrative cost may be compared with the cost of about 0.2
percent charged now in indexed equity funds by mutual fund companies like Vanguard and
Fidelity. Bond funds generally have lower administrative charges.
60 Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwicksimulation therefore uses a two-step procedure to simulate the uncertain
future annual returns. For each of ten thousand simulations, we begin by
generating a mean real log return on the portfolio from a normal distribu-
tion with a mean of 0.055 and a standard deviation of 0.0175, which is
equal to the standard error of the estimated mean based on the number
of years in the sample. We then use this estimated realization of the mean
and the standard deviation of 0.125 to generate a seventy-one-year se-
quence of portfolio returns from the year 2000 to the year 2070. We repeat
this ten thousand times.
Although equation (6) for p(s) describes the way in which the log value
of the PRA account would evolve during the accumulation years were
there no external additions, in practice the actual individual PRA account
is also augmented by the fraction  of the individual’s wage and by the
distributed share of the PRA balances of those members of the cohort
who die during the year. We simulate this evolution at the level of the birth
cohort (rather than of the individual) by
(9) Ms Rs Ms wsNs () [ ( ) ] ( ) () () , =+ − −+ 11 1 
where M(s) is the aggregate PRA balance for the cohort as a whole, R(s)
is the rate of return in period s, N(s) is the number of living members of
the cohort, w(s) is the average wage, and  is the share of wages saved and
contributed to the PRA accounts. Since this equation is in level rather
than log form, the value of 1  R(s)  exp[r(s)], where r(s) is the log rate
of return in period s implied by
(10) rs ps ps us () () ( ) () . =− − = + 1 	
With the standard deviation of 0.125 and the assumption that the log re-
turns are normally distributed, the “level” or “money” rate of return is 6.9
percent before subtracting the administrative costs; that is, E[1  R(s)]
 E[exp(r(s))]  exp[E(r(s))  0.5 2]  1.069.
2.3.2 The Uncertain Return on Incremental Capital
The value of the individual’s PRA annuities depends on the value of the
PRA account and therefore on the market return on stocks and bonds. In
contrast, the government’s incremental corporate-tax revenue depends on
the size of the incremental capital stock and the proﬁtability of that capi-
tal. In our nonstochastic analysis in section 2.2, we simpliﬁed by assuming
that the size of the capital stock could be represented by the market value
of the PRA account and that the corporate-tax revenue could be repre-
sented by 2 percent of the PRA assets.
We now consider a more realistic evolution of the size of the capital
stock and of the proﬁtability of the capital. Let K(s) be the value of the
increment to the capital stock in period s as a result of the PRA saving
system begun at s  0. The evolution of the incremental capital stock can
be written
When Portfolio Returns and Capital Proﬁtability Are Uncertain 61(11) sltax
ANN
Ks s r r Ks
sW s s
() { [ ] [ () ] } ( )
() () () ,






where R(s) is the real pretax return on capital in year s, r is the real interest
rate paid by ﬁrms,  is the ratio of debt to capital, sltax is the state and
local tax paid per dollar of capital, 
 is the eﬀective marginal federal
corporate-tax rate on proﬁts net of interest and of state and local tax pay-
ments, (s) is the PRA saving deposit as a fraction of covered earnings
[W(s)], and ANN(s) is the annuity withdrawals in that year.
In this notation, R(s)K(s  1) is the pretax incremental proﬁts before
interest expenses, that is, the product of the marginal product of capital
and the size of the incremental capital stock. Since  is the ratio of debt
to capital, K(s  1) is the corporate debt, and rK(s  1) is the real
interest paid on that debt.25 Since most of the state and local taxes are
property taxes, we approximate the total state and local tax as a fraction
of the property tax, sltax K(s  1). Since the corporate tax at rate 
 is
levied on proﬁts net of interest, the proﬁts after taxes and interest are
[1
][R(s)  rsltax]K(s  1). The division of these net proﬁts between
dividends and retained earnings is not relevant in the current context be-
cause, since both accrue to the PRAs, there is no diﬀerence in their tax
treatment or in their contribution to PRA assets and the associated capital
stock. The other sources of change in the value of the capital stock are
the addition of the PRA saving deposits, (s)W(s), and the subtraction of
the annuity payments, ANN(s).
Since R(s) is not a ﬁnancial rate of return but the actual year-to-year
proﬁtability at the company level,26 the R(s) time series will not have the
serial independence property of a ﬁnancial return in an eﬃcient market.
Instead, R(s) will exhibit the serially correlated property of a business-
cycle variable. We have used the annual values of R(s) recently developed
by Poterba (1998) to estimate the parameters of an ARIMA process. After
experimenting with a variety of speciﬁcations, we estimated the follow-
ing speciﬁcation:
(12) ln ( ) . . ( ) . ( ) ( ), RR s s es es = + −+ −+ 0 017 0 793 1 0 562 1
where the stochastic innovation e(s) has mean zero and standard devia-
tion 0.006.
Although market eﬃciency implies that the innovations in the portfolio-
62 Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwick
25. We simplify by ignoring inﬂation and, therefore, the diﬀerence between the real interest
rate and the tax-deductible nominal interest rate. We take this into account, however, in the
numerical value used for the corporate-tax rate.
26. Pretax capital income of the nonﬁnancial corporate sector is the sum of pretax proﬁts,
net interest payments, and the property and proﬁts taxes paid to state and local governments.
The capital is the sum of reproducible equipment and structures at reproduction cost plus
the estimated market value of the land. For more detail on the nature of these estimates, see
Poterba (1998) and Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983).return process are serially independent, they can be contemporaneously
correlated with the innovations in the proﬁtability process. To simulate the
simultaneous evolution of the PRA accounts and the corporate proﬁts, we
estimate the correlation between the residual in the corporate-proﬁtability
equation (i.e., e[s] in eq. [12]) and the innovation in the log rate of return
that drives the PRA ﬂuctuations (i.e., u[s] in eq. [10]). Since the estimated
correlation is very small, just 0.024, we do not incorporate it in our simula-
tions.
With the process speciﬁed in equation (12) for generating values of
R(s), it is possible to calculate the additional federal corporate-proﬁts tax
associated with the incremental capital. We begin by generating ten thou-
sand samples of the time vector of R(s) values for the years 2000–2070
and for each time vector of R(s) values, using equation (11) to calculate
a corresponding K(s) series. For this calculation, we use Poterba’s estimate
that the state and local taxes as a fraction of the capital stock are sltax 
0.012. We take the corporate debt-capital ratio to be 0.4, the same
share of capital that we assume in our PRA portfolio and the average
share of debt on corporate balance sheets. With a real rate of interest of
r  0.033, we have r0.0132. Finally, Poterba’s estimate that federal
taxes were 2.2 percent of capital during this period implies that 
[R(s) 
rsltax]  .022 or, with R  .085, r0.0132, and sltax  0.012, that
the eﬀective rate of federal tax on this measure of taxable income was 

0.37. We then calculate the corporate tax using the same R(s) values in
(13) TAX sltax () [ () ] ( ) . ss r K s =− − − 
 R 1
With 
0.37, this tax equation implies that federal tax revenue at the
mean value of R(s)  0.085 is 2.2 percent of K(s  1) and therefore ap-
proximately 2.1 percent of K(s).
2.4 Individual Risk in the Transition from PAYGO
Pensions to Investment-Based Pensions
We are now ready to examine the probability distribution of retirement
incomes during the transition from the existing system to a completely
investment-based system. Our emphasis is on assessing the risk that the
incomes provided in this way will be judged to be too low and seeing the
sensitivity of this risk to diﬀerent PRA saving rules. The current results
thus extend the analysis of individual risk in Feldstein and Ranguelova
(forthcoming, sec. 3). The earlier study looked just at the risks in a fully
privatized system in the year 2070, when all retirees were assumed to have
contributed to PRAs throughout their working life and to have only PRA
annuities and no tax-ﬁnanced PAYGO beneﬁts. In the current study, we
look at individuals of diﬀerent birth cohorts in diﬀerent years along the
transition path (2010, 2020, 2030, 2050, and 2070) and, for each cohort in
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from the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity.
The PAYGO beneﬁt in each year is reduced relative to the benchmark
beneﬁts according to the schedules implied in section 2.2 above. For ex-
ample, if we use the basic portfolio rate of return (with a mean real log re-
turn of 5.5 percent after administrative expenses), we reduce the PAYGO
beneﬁt of each age cohort in each year (relative to the benchmark beneﬁt
that would be paid if there were no PRA annuity) by the amount that
such individuals would expect to receive from their PRA annuities if those
annuities earned the expected rate of return.27 The individual bears all the
risk—both positive and negative—associated with the uncertainty of the
PRA annuity. If the PRA annuity for a particular cohort in a particular
year turns out to equal the annuity that would result at the expected rate
of return, the combination of the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annuity
would exactly equal the benchmark beneﬁt. Table 2.6 shows the PAYGO
beneﬁts for the diﬀerent age cohorts in the selected years that we examine.
In the early years, the PAYGO beneﬁts remain a substantial fraction of
the benchmark level. But, by 2030, this ratio has begun to decline signiﬁ-
cantly, and, by 2070, all living cohorts are no longer receiving PAYGO
beneﬁts.
The risk that the combination of the PAYGO beneﬁt and the PRA annu-
ity will be unacceptably small relative to the benchmark beneﬁt increases
as we move to more distant future years. That risk can be reduced by in-
creasingthePRAsavingrateabovethelevelthatwasadequatewhenuncer-
tainty was ignored. A fundamentally diﬀerent alternative approach is to
provide a supplementary conditional PAYGO beneﬁt; we examine this
intergenerational risk-sharing approach in section 2.5.
Table 2.7 shows the distribution of “combined beneﬁts” (i.e., the sum
of the PAYGO and the PRA beneﬁts) corresponding to the basic PRA
saving rates that we used in the nonstochastic case reported in table 2.1
above: all employees save 3 percent of taxable earnings per year from the
Table 2.6 PAYGO Beneﬁts by Birth Cohort at Selected Dates (all ﬁgures are
expressed as % of benchmark beneﬁts)
Age in Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
60 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.00
50 0.00 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.65 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.29
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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27. Recall that the nonstochastic rate of return that we use is about 1 percent lower than
the expected return based on the stochastic distribution of PRA annuities. This causes us to
provide higher PAYGO annuities.year 2000 (when the transition begins) to the year 2006 and then 4.25
percent of taxable earnings in each year after that. We present results for
ﬁve diﬀerent birth cohorts (identiﬁed by their age in year 2000) and ﬁve
diﬀerent future years. We report these combined beneﬁts as fractions of
the benchmark beneﬁt for that cohort in that year, that is, the level of
beneﬁt called for in current law. We present six points on the probability
Table 2.7 Combined Beneﬁt Distributions by Birth Cohort at Selected Dates
(all ﬁgures are expressed as % of benchmark beneﬁts)
Age in Year 2000
and Percentile 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
60:
1 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.00
2 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.00
5 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.00
10 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.00
50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
90 1.02 1.03 1.04 0.00 0.00
50:
1 0.00 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.00
2 0.00 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.00
5 0.00 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.00
10 0.00 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.00
50 0.00 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.00
90 0.00 1.14 1.21 1.34 0.00
40:
1 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.68 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.69 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.71 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.74 0.00
50 0.00 0.00 1.06 1.00 0.00
90 0.00 0.00 1.56 1.97 0.00
30:
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.33
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.34
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.37
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.42
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 0.96
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.95 4.05
21:
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.06
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.09
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.14
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.21
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.22 1.05
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.88 5.57
Note: Combined beneﬁts are the sum of the PAYGO beneﬁts shown in table 2.4 and the
PRA annuities that result from saving 3 percent of taxable earnings from 2000 to 2006 and
4.25 percent in all future years. The PRA accounts earn a stochastic return with an expected
real mean log return of 5.5 percent and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent.
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ninetieth percentiles.
Those who are sixty when the program begins have very little risk of
departing from the benchmark beneﬁts, since there are few years of PRA
saving before retirement and PAYGO beneﬁts are therefore high relative
to the benchmark. The median beneﬁt is the benchmark level, and there
i sl e s st h a na1p e r c e n tchance of having less than 99 percent of the bench-
mark level of beneﬁts at age seventy and 98 percent of the benchmark
beneﬁt at ages eighty and ninety. The columns for 2050 and 2070 show
zeros because we assume that no individuals live beyond age one hundred.
The situation is similar for those who are ﬁfty in the year 2000. They
are not yet retired in the year 2010 (which is why zeros appear in that
year). When they are seventy years old (in 2020), the distribution of com-
bined beneﬁts is quite tight, with only a 10 percent chance that the com-
bined beneﬁts are less than 95 percent of the benchmark. There is only a
1 percent chance that the beneﬁts are less than 92 percent of the bench-
mark level. Although the distribution becomes wider as they age (because
the variable annuity means more years of investment), even in the year
2050 (the last year for this cohort) only 5 percent of combined beneﬁts
are less than 88 percent of the benchmark.
But, when we get to the cohort that is forty years old in 2000, there is a
greater risk of what might be considered unacceptably low beneﬁts. Those
who are forty years old in 2000 reach retirement age in 2027 and are sev-
enty years old in 2030. Our analysis shows that, although the median com-
bined beneﬁt for this group is 106 percent of the benchmark, there is a 10
percent chance that the combined beneﬁt will be less than 84 percent of
the benchmark and a 5 percent chance that it will be 77 percent of the
benchmark. These 5 and 10 percent benchmark ratios are 10 percentage
points lower when the cohort reaches age one hundred.
The youngest cohort in our analysis is twenty-one years old in the year
2000 and therefore never receives any PAYGO beneﬁts. With a 3 percent
saving rate for a brief period followed by a 4.25 percent saving rate, there
is a considerable chance that their PRA beneﬁts at retirement will be unac-
ceptably low. Table 2.7 shows that, although the median beneﬁt for this
group at age seventy-one (in 2050) is 122 percent of the benchmark, there
is a 10 percent chance that it will be less than 42 percent of the benchmark
a n da5p e r c e n tchance that it will be less than 31 percent of the bench-
mark level.
These risks can be reduced substantially by increasing the PRA saving
deposits for younger cohorts. Before looking at the speciﬁc results, it
should be stressed that this could be achieved either by requiring younger
cohorts to make larger saving deposits into their PRA accounts or by
having the government make those deposits from general revenue. This
issue of the distribution of the burden during the transition is separate
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sidered further here.
Because the risks of low combined beneﬁts are greatest for the employ-
ees who are aged thirty and younger at the start of the transition in the
year 2000, we present results only for these younger cohorts. Table 2.8
compares three diﬀerent PRA saving rules. For all employees born before
1960, that is, who were forty or older in 2000, each of the rules has a 3
percent saving rate from 2000 to 2006 followed by a 4.25 percent rate, that
is, the same rule displayed in table 2.7. Rule 8A has a higher rate for those
born after 1959:a5p e r c e n ts a ving rate from 2000 to 2006 followed by a
6.25 percent rate. Rule 8B raises these rates to 5.00 percent followed by
6.25 percent for individuals between thirty-one and forty in 2000 and to
6.0 percent and 7.25 percent for those who were under thirty-one in 2000.
Finally, rule 8C raises the rate to 8.25 for those who were under thirty-one
in 2000. Each successive rule reduces the risk of a relatively low level of
combined beneﬁts but does so at an increasing cost in terms of the re-
quired PRA saving rate.
With rule 8C, the group that is thirty years old in 2000 has only a 10
percent chance of receiving combined beneﬁts of less than 82 percent of
the benchmark level when its members are eighty years old and only a 5
percent chance that those beneﬁts will be less than 68 percent of the
benchmark level. As the group reaches one hundred years old, these values
decline to 57 and 47 percent, lower than most individuals would tolerate.
But, since the median payment for this birth cohort is more than twice
the benchmark beneﬁt at age eighty and 1.82 times the benchmark at one
hundred, it may be possible for private markets to provide a way for indi-
viduals to trade some of the upside potential (in the top half of the proba-
bility distribution) for greater protection when there are bad market out-
comes. We do not explore this further here but turn in the next section to
ways in which taxpayers might provide a guarantee.
The need for some supplementation is even clearer when we look at
those who are twenty-one years old in 2000. While the median beneﬁts for
this group at age seventy would be 2.78 times the benchmark beneﬁt, there
is a 5 percent chance that the beneﬁts are less than 70 percent of the
benchmark and a 1 percent chance that the beneﬁts are less than 42 per-
cent of the benchmark. The probability distribution implies more risk at
older ages. Once again, this suggests the potential gain from private trades
of upside potential for downside protection or from a government-
provided protection of beneﬁts.
A key point to be emphasized is that even the most conservative option,
rule 8C, requires a tax of only 9.25 percent for the most heavily taxed
younger cohorts, less than half of what they would pay after 2030 to main-
tain the level of beneﬁts. Individuals may respond to this risk by saving
more voluntarily or seeking market ways to reduce the risk through stock
When Portfolio Returns and Capital Proﬁtability Are Uncertain 67Table 2.8 Eﬀects of Alternative Saving Rules on Combined Beneﬁt Distributions
by Birth Cohort at Selected Dates (all ﬁgures are expressed as % of
benchmark beneﬁts)
Rule and Saving Rates,a
Age in Year 2000, and
Percentile 2050 2070







































Note: Combined beneﬁts are the sum of the relative PAYGO beneﬁts shown in table 2.6
above and the PRA annuities that result from saving 3 percent of taxable earnings from 2000
to 2006 and 4.25 percent in all future years. The PRA accounts earn a stochastic return with
an expected real mean log return of 5.5 percent and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent.
aThe saving rule is described by two numbers for each age group. The ﬁrst number is the
saving rate from 2000 to 2006. The second is the saving rate after that.market options. The extent to which they do so will depend on diﬀerent
attitudes about risk and about the trade-oﬀ between consuming more dur-
ing working years and saving more during working years in order to re-
duce the risk of low income during retirement.
2.5 Government Guarantees and Intergenerational Transfers
The analysis in section 2.4 shows that, although an increased saving
rate can reduce the risk of relatively low combined beneﬁts, it does so
only at a cost of decreased consumption during working years and does
not completely eliminate the risk. We therefore explore an alternative ap-
proach in which the government guarantees the beneﬁts by providing a
conditional beneﬁt equal to the diﬀerence between the benchmark beneﬁt
and the combined beneﬁt that the individual receives from the PAYGO
and the PRA annuities.28
We recognize that this guarantee could encourage excessive risk taking
by individuals to the extent that they are free to select more risky portfo-
lios. One possible way to eliminate this incentive is to deﬁne the guarantee
in terms of the standard portfolio. In such an approach, the government
would provide a conditional beneﬁt equal to the diﬀerence between the
benchmark beneﬁt and the combined beneﬁt that the individual would
have received from a combination of PAYGO and PRA annuities if the
PRA funds had been invested in the standard portfolio, consisting of the 60
percent broadly based equity fund and the 40 percent bond fund. In this
way, an individual is completely protected if he or she invests in the stan-
dard portfolio but bears the full beneﬁt or cost of the risks associated with
alternative portfolios. Since we focus our analysis in this paper on the
risks associated with the standard portfolio, we do not discuss the issue of
alternative portfolios further.
The cost of these pension guarantees depends on the rate at which indi-
viduals make PRA saving deposits during their preretirement years, with
higher saving rates requiring smaller conditional guarantee payments. We
therefore focus on the most expensive of the cases that we have considered,
the base case in which all working individuals save 3 percent of their tax-
able earnings from the year 2000 to the year 2006 and then save 4.25 per-
cent of their taxable earnings, the amounts that we analyzed in the nonsto-
chastic case and that determine the future path of PAYGO beneﬁts.
Table 2.9 shows the distribution of the aggregate beneﬁt shortfall for
the total of all cohorts of retirees in each year, that is, of the amount that
would be necessary to supplement the combined beneﬁts of all cohorts in
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28. This is the approach analyzed in Feldstein and Ranguelova (forthcoming) for a single
year rather than for the entire transition path. The tables in this section correspond to the
single table 3 in that paper.each year to bring each cohort’s total beneﬁt up to the benchmark level.
Each entry in the table shows the probability that the total burden required
to ﬁnance the conditional beneﬁts is below the speciﬁed amount; for ex-
ample, there is a 95 percent probability that the conditional beneﬁts in the
year 2030 would be less than 2.36 percent of earnings.
In 2010 and 2020, there is a 99 percent probability that the conditional
transfer would be less than 1 percent of earnings. Even in 2070, when the
transition to the investment-based system is virtually complete (except for
retirees who are over age ninety), there is a 50 percent probability that
virtually no transfer (i.e., less than one-tenth of 1 percent of covered earn-
ings) would be needed. In the worst 10 percent of cases, the conditional
transfer exceeds 11.6 percent of earnings, and, in the worst 1 percent of
the cases, the conditional transfer exceeds 15.5 percent of earnings. In
considering these risks to taxpayers, it should be recalled that the payroll
tax of 18.7 percent that would have been required in a pure PAYGO sys-
tem has been completely eliminated and replaced with the PRA saving
deposits of 4.25 percent of taxable earnings. Thus, there is only about one
chance in ﬁfty that the combination of the PRA saving deposits and the
tax required for the conditional beneﬁt will exceed the 18.7 percent
PAYGO tax that would be required in the pure PAYGO system. There is
a 98 percent probability that the combined cost to the taxpayers of the
PRA system with the conditional guarantee beneﬁt would be less costly.
Moreover, in the nearly 50 percent of simulations in which no guarantee
payment is needed, the retirees receive more income from the PRA than
they would have from the benchmark PAYGO beneﬁt.
Although these conditional guarantee payments represent transfers
from the working generation of taxpayers to the generation of retirees,
there is a high probability that much or all of the transfer in each year can
Table 2.9 Distribution of Conditional Guarantee Payments for Benchmark
as Minimum Total Beneﬁt (all ﬁgures are expressed as % of
taxable earnings)
Percentile 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07
60 0.00 0.03 0.17 1.01 1.48
70 0.01 0.15 0.74 3.32 4.74
80 0.03 0.32 1.32 5.57 8.25
90 0.05 0.50 1.98 7.75 11.63
95 0.06 0.62 2.36 9.00 13.49
98 0.08 0.74 2.72 9.98 14.85
99 0.08 0.81 2.87 10.49 15.55
70 Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwickbe ﬁnanced by the incremental corporate income-tax payments that result
from the incremental saving caused by the PRA system. We calculate for
each year the distribution of the diﬀerence between the conditional trans-
fer required to bring the combined beneﬁt up to the benchmark level and
the incremental corporate-tax revenue available for that purpose. If the
incremental corporate-tax revenue is not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the condi-
tional transfer, we say that a net transfer is required. Table 2.10 shows the
distribution of net transfers.
The incremental corporate-tax revenue is suﬃcient to ﬁnance all the
required transfers in 2010 and 2020. In 2030, the probability of any net
transfer is reduced to 2 percent, and the probability of a net transfer
greater than 1 percent of earnings is reduced to less than 1 percent. Even
in 2050, there is only a 10 percent probability of any net transfer.
The maximum risk of transfers occurs in 2070, when the phase-in of the
PRA system is complete. In the worst 5 percent of cases in 2070, the net
transfer is 5.6 percent of covered earnings. Combining this with the PRA
deposits of 4.25 percent of earnings gives a total net burden on taxpayers
of 9.85 percent of earnings, about half the payroll tax that would be re-
quired in that year with a pure PAYGO system. There is only a 1 percent
chance that the sum of the 4.25 percent PRA deposit and the net transfer
9.52 percent of earnings will exceed 13.77 percent of earnings, or about
two-thirds of the payroll-tax rate, in the pure PAYGO system.
2.6 An Expected-Utility Evaluation
Although we believe that displaying the probability distributions of pos-
sible outcomes is the best way to indicate the risks of the alternative
investment-based options, in this section we present explicit summary cal-
Table 2.10 Distribution of Net Transfers: Conditional Guarantee Payments in
Excess of Available Corporate-Tax Revenue (all ﬁgures are expressed
as % of taxable earnings)
Percentile 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.84 3.23
95 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.24 5.63
98 0.00 0.00 0.47 4.58 8.09
99 0.00 0.00 0.79 5.44 9.52
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(CRRA) utility functions.29 We focus on the case of the individual who is
twenty-one in the year 2000 and for whom the risk of the PRA option
is greatest.
To evaluate the PRA options presented in section 2.4, we consider
a representative individual with expected-utility function E 
E[ ptt21u(Ct)], where the summation is from t  21 to t  100 and
u(Ct)  (Ct
1
  1)/(1 
 ). Here, E is the expectation operator, pt is the
probability of surviving to age t from age twenty-one,  is the time-
discount factor at which utility is discounted, and 
 is the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion. We do the analysis with time-discount factors of
0.98; alternative calculations with a greater discount factor (0.96) and
with no time-discount factor (1) have very little eﬀect on the results
that we report below.
We recognize the restrictive nature of this speciﬁcation. The function is
additively separable, and the relative risk aversion in each period, uc/u

 , is a constant and is independent of age. Despite these limitations,
these calculations may be useful to some readers as a supplement to the
direct information of the outcome distributions.
The individual who is age twenty-one in 2000 earns the age-speciﬁc
wage for this cohort projected by the social security actuaries and pays a
proportional income tax equal to 20 percent of that wage. We consider a
variety of diﬀerent PRA saving rates. With a 6 percent PRA saving rate,
the net income during the working years from age twenty-one to age sixty-
six is 74 percent of the gross wage.30 The individual is assumed to do no
other saving, making the consumption in each preretirement year the
same 74 percent of pretax wages.31 During retirement, the individual’s con-
sumption is the variable annuity that is generated by the PRA savings
since this age cohort no longer contributes to the PAYGO system.
We contrast each of the possible PRA plans with the PAYGO system in
which the tax rate is 18.7 percent, making the net consumption during
the preretirement years equal to 62 percent of preretirement income. This
PAYGO system is assumed to provide the benchmark level of beneﬁts pre-
scribed in current law during each retirement year with no uncertainty.
The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is the key parameter in this
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29. This section draws heavily on Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998, sec. 5).
30. This represents a simpliﬁcation in several ways. Although we are looking at wages for
the years beginning in 2000, we are ignoring the transition problem and comparing a fully
phased-in PRA system with the PAYGO system that would also exist in the more distant
future. We do this to avoid the complexities of modeling the transition. We also simplify by
treating the projected wages as the marginal product of capital from which all taxes and
saving are subtracted.
31. The lack of other saving reduces the individual’s level of retirement consumption and
therefore makes the individual’s utility more sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the return to PRA
saving.expected-utility evaluation. We do not impose an explicit value of the rela-
tive risk aversion on the problem but calculate for each saving rate the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion that would make the representative in-
dividual prefer the “riskless” PAYGO program to the PRA program. We
then repeat the analysis for the PRA system with the government guar-
antee.
We drew ten thousand independent histories of the eighty-year se-
quence (from age twenty-one in 2000 to age one hundred in 2079) of re-
turns on the PRA savings of the representative individual and calculated
the expected-utility value associated with each value of 
. Our calculations
show that the PRA with a 3 percent saving rate is preferable to the PAYGO
system for the relative-risk-aversion coeﬃcient up to 
2.6. With a 5
percent saving rate, the critical value of 
 is 3.2, while, witha9p e r c e n t
saving rate, the PRA system is preferred to PAYGO for all values of 
 less
than 3.85.
In considering these critical values of 
, it is useful to consider the impli-
cation of diﬀerent 
 values for the rate at which the marginal utility of
consumption declines as income rises. A value of 
2.6 implies that a
doubling of income causes the marginal utility of another dollar of income
to fall by a factor of 6.06, that is, by 22.6. Readers must decide for them-
selves whether this value of 
 is “high” or “low.”32 Our judgment is that a
value of 
 that causes such a sharp decline in the marginal utility of in-
come is very high. This in turn implies that individuals would prefer any
of the PRA systems to the PAYGO system.
We recognize that the values of 
 inferred in the ﬁnance literature from
the diﬀerence between the yield on stocks and that on “risk-free” Treasury
bills are substantially higher than these critical values of 
 (see, e.g., Me-
hra and Prescott 1985; and Kocherlakota 1996). We regard those market-
based values of 
 as implausibly high and appropriately characterized as
an equity-premium “puzzle.”
2.6.1 Evaluating Government-Guarantee Plans
with CRRA Expected Utility
When we turn from the pure individualistic PRA system to one with a
government guarantee, we can no longer focus on a single age cohort but
must consider the beneﬁts received by all retirees aged sixty-ﬁve through
one hundred and the taxes paid by employees of all ages. We therefore
examine the situation during a representative year after the PRA system
is fully phased in. We compare the possible outcomes of the PRA system
(for alternative possible saving rates) with the PAYGO system in the long
run with an 18.7 percent tax rate.
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32. Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998, sec. 5) present a mental experiment that may help
each reader decide what value of 
 reﬂects his or her own preferences.More speciﬁcally, we calculate the expected value of a social welfare
function in the ﬁrst year in which the PRA system is fully phased in. This
is the year 2079, when the youngest workers in 2000 (those who are then
twenty-one years old) have reached one hundred, the oldest age that we
consider in our analysis. The value of the social welfare function in that
year is the sum of the expected utilities of the employed taxpayers and the
retirees: SWF  E[ Nju(Cj)], where the summation is now over the eighty
cohorts identiﬁed by age (from j  21 to j  100), E is again the expecta-
tions operator, Nj is the number of individuals in cohort j in the year 2079,
and u(Cj) is the utility of the consumption of the representative individual
in cohort j in that year. The form of the utility function is the same CRRA
function speciﬁed above. In each of the ten thousand simulations that we
do, we simulate the PRA accumulation of each cohort over the eighty-
year horizon from 2000 until 2079 and then calculate the associated PRA
annuity in that year for each retiree cohort. We then specify that the indi-
viduals in each retiree cohort consume the greater of the benchmark bene-
ﬁt and the PRA annuity of that cohort in that year.33
Retirees thus face no risk of consuming less than the benchmark beneﬁt.
All the adverse uncertainty is focused on the taxpayers, who must pay an
uncertain tax bill. In particular, with a 6 percent PRA saving rate and a
20 percent income tax, the consumption of workers in cohort j is 74 per-
cent of the cohort-speciﬁc wage unless they are called on to pay a supple-
mentary tax to ﬁll the gap between a low PRA annuity and the benchmark
beneﬁt. As we noted above, the ﬁrst source of revenue to ﬁll this gap would
be the incremental corporate-tax revenue that results from the PRA capi-
tal. In our analysis, we assume that employees make annual adjustments
to their consumption when needed to ﬁll the retiree-income gap even
though some form of smoothing behavior would reduce the adverse utility
eﬀects of these uncertain extra tax burdens.
We contrast this PRA system with a riskless PAYGO system with an
18.7 percent tax and with the benchmark beneﬁts during retirement. We
ﬁnd that the PRA system with the government guarantee dominates the
PAYGO system for each of the saving rates between 3 and 9 percent and
for every CRRA parameter value up to 
40! These simulations tell us
that a CRRA individual with any degree of risk aversion that we have con-
sidered would prefer the PRA system with government guarantees to the
current PAYGO system.34
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33. This expected social welfare function value for a single year is of course diﬀerent from
the expected lifetime utility that we used to evaluate the choice between PRA and PAYGO
plans. It would be desirable to use a framework in which for each of the eighty cohorts we
evaluated the expected present value of lifetime utility. Unfortunately, the data requirements
for that calculation stretch further into the future than the projections of the social security
actuaries and the Census Bureau.
34. The magnitude of the gain from shifting from a PAYGO system to a PRA system with
a government guarantee depends on the value of 
. Smetters’s (chap. 3 in this volume) anal-2.7 Risk Aspects of a Mixed System of PAYGO
and Investment-Based Beneﬁts
We return now to the type of mixed system that combines PAYGO and
investment-based beneﬁts that we discussed in the nonstochastic analysis
of section 2.2.4. We ﬁx the PAYGO tax rate at its current 12.4 percent
level for all future years. We also have a constant rate of saving in the PRA
accounts equal to 2.3 percent of covered earnings.
The nonstochastic simulation in section 2.4 showed that this combina-
tion of PAYGO beneﬁts and PRA annuities would provide more than the
PAYGO level of beneﬁts if the real return in the PRA accounts is 5.5
percent. We now recognize the uncertainty of the PRA returns. We begin
with the assumption that the retirees bear all the risk of this uncertain
return. Thus, they receive either more or less than the benchmark beneﬁts.
We then consider an alternative arrangement in which retirees are guaran-
teed to receive at least the benchmark level of beneﬁts.
Table 2.11 shows the probability distributions of the combination of
PAYGO beneﬁts35 and PRA annuities for diﬀerent birth cohorts at selected
years during the transition. These combined beneﬁts are expressed as mul-
tiples of the benchmark beneﬁts.
For those who are sixty years old in the year 2000, the time to accumu-
late PRA funds is too short for the uncertainty to matter. The ﬁfty-year-
olds have ﬁfteen years of accumulation and the uncertain returns during
the annuity period. The median level of the combined payout for this co-
hort remains very close to the benchmark beneﬁt, declining from 103 per-
cent of the benchmark at age seventy to 101 percent at age one hundred.
In the worst 1 percent of simulations for this group, the combined beneﬁt
remains above 94 percent of the benchmark beneﬁt. As compensation for
this downside risk, there is a 10 percent probability that the beneﬁts will
exceed 112 percent of the benchmark level at age seventy and higher mul-
tiples in subsequent years.
The forty-year-olds in 2000 are also exposed to little downside risk in
this mixed system. Even in the worst 1 percent of cases, the level of com-
bined beneﬁts exceeds 90 percent of the benchmark at age seventy and 86
percent at age ninety. The upside potential is now greater, with a 10 per-
cent chance of a combined beneﬁt that exceeds the benchmark by 42 per-
cent at age seventy and by 68 percent at age ninety.
The highest-risk cases are of course the youngest cohorts since they will
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ysis of the cost of risk bearing in investment-based accounts relies implicitly on market-
based measures of the risk premium. The high value of 
 implicit in his analysis may explain
his conclusion about the limited gain from adopting a PRA-type plan.
35. In this stochastic context, the PAYGO beneﬁt for each individual in each year is calcu-
lated as the benchmark beneﬁt minus the 75 percent of the PRA annuity that would be paid
if the individual’s PRA savings had earned the 5.5 percent real return.have the greatest exposure to PRA beneﬁts relative to PAYGO beneﬁts
when they retire. The twenty-one-year-olds in 2000 will have made PRA
contributions of 2.3 percent throughout their working life and will there-
fore have the full risk not only in the transition but thereafter. The median
combined beneﬁt for this group is 127 percent of the benchmark PAYGO
Table 2.11 Combined Beneﬁt Distributions by Birth Cohort at Selected Dates,
Mixed PAYGO and Investment-Based System (all ﬁgures are expressed
as % of benchmark beneﬁts)
Age in Year 2000
and Percentile 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
60:
1 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00
2 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00
5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00
10 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00
50 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
90 1.02 1.03 1.03 0.00 0.00
50:
1 0.00 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.00
2 0.00 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.00
5 0.00 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.00
10 0.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.00
50 0.00 1.03 1.02 1.01 0.00
90 0.00 1.12 1.16 1.25 0.00
40:
1 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.86 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.86 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.88 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.89 0.00
50 0.00 0.00 1.09 1.05 0.00
90 0.00 0.00 1.42 1.68 0.00
30:
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.70
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.71
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.73
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.75
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.15 1.08
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.33 3.00
21:
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.59
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.60
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.63
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.67
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.27 1.17
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.89 3.88
Note: Combined beneﬁts are the sum of the PAYGO beneﬁts generated by the 12.4 percent
payroll tax and the PRA annuities that result from saving 2.3 percent of taxable earnings in
all years. The PRA accounts earn a stochastic return with an expected real mean log return
of 5.5 percent and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent.
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79 percent of the benchmark at age seventy-one and 67 percent at age
ninety-one. There is only one chance in one hundred of receiving less than
66 percent of the benchmark beneﬁts at age seventy-one and 59 percent
at age ninety-one. Another way of describing the limit to the risk faced by
this cohort is to note that, for this cohort, the PAYGO beneﬁts would
represent 55 percent of the benchmark level of beneﬁts and that any value
in the PRA accounts would therefore be in excess of that. An indication
of the compensating upside potential is that there is a 10 percent chance
that the combined beneﬁts will be nearly three times the benchmark bene-
ﬁt at age seventy-one and an even higher multiple in later years.
As we noted earlier, individuals will diﬀer in their attitudes toward risk
and toward the timing of consumption. Some individuals would save more
than the required 2.3 percent in order to reduce the risk of an inadequate
income in retirement. Others may seek market-based opportunities to re-
duce the downside risk by trading some of the upside potential.
It is again possible for the government to reduce the risk to retirees by
an intergenerational guarantee, a conditional beneﬁt that guarantees that
the combination of the PRA beneﬁt and the PAYGO beneﬁt is at least as
large as the benchmark beneﬁt. The guarantee that we assume takes the
following form: Each retiree is guaranteed that the sum of his or her pay-
ment from the government (including the basic PAYGO beneﬁt plus any
conditional beneﬁt) plus 75 percent of PRA payment for the year will be
at least equal to the benchmark beneﬁt. Operationally, if the basic PAYGO
beneﬁt (based on the assumption of a 5.5 percent real return) plus 75 per-
cent of the individual’s PRA annuity is less than the benchmark beneﬁt,
the government supplements the PAYGO beneﬁt by enough to bring that
totaluptothebenchmarkbeneﬁt.36The individualthusreceivesthebench-
mark beneﬁt amount plus 25 percent of the PRA annuity.37
The cost to the taxpayers of providing this guarantee is relatively small,
as shown in table 2.12. In 2050, there is essentially a 50 percent chance
that no money need be given to any of the retired cohorts. By 2070, that
is still essentially true; the median value of the transfer in the ten thousand
simulations is equal to only 0.07 percent of earnings in that year. There is
only one chance in ten that the funds needed exceed 5.32 percent of cov-
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36. Recall that, if the individuals are given discretion about the investment that they make
with the PRA funds, the guarantee would be deﬁned in terms of the annuity that would have
been provided by investments in the standard portfolio of a 60 percent broad stock fund and
a 40 percent corporate bond fund. Thus, if the basic PAYGO beneﬁt (based on the assump-
tion of a 5.5 percent real return) plus 75 percent of what the individual’s PRA annuity
would be if the PRA deposits had always been invested in the standard fund is less than the
benchmark beneﬁt, the government supplements the PAYGO beneﬁt by enough to bring that
total up to the benchmark beneﬁt.
37. In the unlikely event that the PRA annuity implied by the standard portfolio is so large
that 75 percent of its value exceeds the benchmark beneﬁt, the retiree gets the full PRA
annuity and no government funds.ered earnings and only one chance in one hundred that the required funds
exceed 6.92 percent of covered earnings.
Shifting from these gross tax requirements to the revenue needed net of
the incremental corporate tax reduces the needed funds substantially, as
shown in table 2.13. Even in 2070, there is only one chance in ten that any
net transfer will be required and only one chance in ﬁfty that the net trans-
fer will exceed 3.7 percent of covered earnings. Combining the 12.4 per-
cent PAYGO tax, the 2.3 percent PRA deposits, and the 3.7 percent net
transfer still gives a total of 18.4 percent of covered earnings, less than the
payroll tax that would be required in a pure PAYGO system.
Table 2.13 Distribution of Net Transfers: Conditional Guarantee Payments in
Excess of Available Corporate-Tax Revenue in Mixed PAYGO-PRA
System (all ﬁgures are expressed as % of taxable earnings)
Percentile 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 1.30
95 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.09 2.56
98 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.74 3.66
99 0.00 0.00 0.22 2.15 4.52
Table 2.12 Distribution of Conditional Guarantee Payments for Mixed PAYGO-
PRA System (all ﬁgures are expressed as % of taxable earnings)
Percentile 2010 2020 2030 2050 2070
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07
60 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.55 1.02
70 0.01 0.08 0.37 1.66 2.50
80 0.01 0.17 0.64 2.66 3.93
90 0.03 0.26 0.96 3.63 5.32
95 0.03 0.32 1.14 4.17 6.08
98 0.04 0.38 1.31 4.60 6.64
99 0.05 0.41 1.38 4.82 6.92
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In this chapter, we examine the feasibility of a transition from the ex-
isting PAYGO system of social security to a system that is completely or
partially investment based, using individual accounts invested in stock and
bond mutual funds. Our analysis focuses on the uncertainty of portfolio
returns and the volatility of capital stock proﬁtability.
We begin by studying how a simple transition could work with no un-
certainty. Using the 1998 social security trustees’ projections and eco-
nomic assumptions, we show that PRA deposits of 3 percent of taxable
earnings in addition to the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax would be
suﬃcient to start the transition and that the resulting 15.4 percent would
be the maximum saving plus tax share of taxable earnings rate that would
ever be necessary in the transition to a completely investment-based sys-
tem. Over time, the payroll tax could be reduced (because PRA annuities
reduce the need for PAYGO beneﬁts), while the PRA saving rate rises to
4.25. By 2050, the combined saving plus tax payments are less than 10
percent, and, by 2070 (and after), the payroll tax is eliminated, and the
only remaining payment is the PRA saving rate of 4.25 percent.
Our analysis then shifts to the more modest goal of a mixed system that
maintains the current 12.4 percent payroll tax and uses the investment-
based system to ﬁnance about one-third of beneﬁts. We show that the
social security beneﬁts projected in current law (the benchmark beneﬁts)
can be ﬁnanced by supplementing the PAYGO beneﬁts that are possible
with a 12.4 percent payroll tax with PRA annuities that result from saving
2.3 percent of taxable earnings.
We then use the postwar experience to assess the risks associated with
a PRA portfolio of 60 percent stocks and 40 percent bonds. We study the
risks to retirees in the transition to a completely investment-based system
and in the ﬁnal posttransition economy. The same mix of assets is used to
ﬁnance the variable annuities after retirement. We ﬁnd that the basic PRA
saving path that is satisfactory in the absence of uncertainty begins to
cause potential risks of low beneﬁts to those who retire in 2050 and after.
Although the median level of beneﬁts for these cohorts is above the level
of beneﬁts projected for the pure PAYGO system under current law (the
benchmark beneﬁts), there is a 10 percent chance that the combination of
PAYGO and PRA beneﬁts will be less than 50 percent of the benchmark.
The risk of relatively low beneﬁts can be reduced substantially by in-
creasing the PRA saving rate for the younger cohorts of workers. For ex-
ample, with a PRA saving rate that starts at 8 percent of taxable earnings
and rises to 9.25 percent of taxable earnings, the cohort that is thirty years
old at the time that the transition begins will have only a 10 percent chance
of receiving combined beneﬁts of less than 82 percent of the benchmark
and only a 5 percent chance that those beneﬁts will be less than 68 percent
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historic experience implies that there is still a small probability that retire-
ment beneﬁts could be substantially less than the benchmark.
We therefore explore an alternative way to reduce the risk to retirees by
a system of conditional intergenerational transfers, that is, payments from
the taxpayers to retirees whose combined beneﬁts (i.e., PAYGO plus PRA)
are less than the benchmark level. We assess the probability distribution
of the taxes required to ﬁnance these transfers. After netting out the incre-
mental corporate-tax receipts (i.e., the corporate-tax payments on the in-
creased size of the corporate-sector capital that results from the PRA sav-
ing), we ﬁnd that, even in 2070 (when the risk is greatest), there is only a
20 percent probability of needing any net funds to ﬁnance the transfer to
retirees. Even when such additional net ﬁnancing is needed in 2070, there
isonly a5 percentchance thatthe requirednet transferwould exceed6 per-
cent of earnings. Thus, even with the PRA saving of 4.25 percent of earn-
ings, the taxpayers would have a total burden (10.25 percent) that was
only slightly more than half the payroll tax that would be required in a
pure PAYGO system, while the retirees would have at least as much retire-
ment income as they would under the pure PAYGO system.
Finally, we consider the transition to a mixed system that maintains the
12.4 percent payroll tax to ﬁnance PAYGO beneﬁts and adds a 2.3 percent
saving rate into PRAs. The high level of PAYGO beneﬁts in this mixed
system substantially reduces the risk to retirees. This risk can be com-
pletely eliminated by a government guarantee ﬁnanced by a combination
of additional taxes and the incremental corporate-tax revenue that results
from the PRA savings. We show that the extra risk to taxpayers in provid-
ing this guarantee is very small.
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Comment Robert J. Shiller
Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (FRS) study a number of the pos-
sible reforms of the social security system. Each reform involves the cre-
ation of personal retirement accounts (PRAs) and each the eventual elimi-
nation of the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system or reduction to a
system that is only two-thirds PAYGO. The reforms appear to be feasible
today, and those that do not eliminate PAYGO appear to be within the
broad bounds of political acceptability.
This paper has the most concrete suggestions for reform of the social
security system of any of the papers in this volume; the authors present the
exact tax rates and contribution rates. Moreover, the paper takes careful
account of a number of parameters of our economy and uses these to
produce explicit simulations of the eﬀects of the various reforms.
The paper centers on the transition from the current system. The transi-
tion is a topic that has often been overlooked in public discussions. FRS
show policy regimes that are designed so that retirees are expected to earn
at least the currently mandated social security beneﬁt during the entire
transition. In studying the reforms proposed in this paper, the focus of
attention is on the risk that individuals in some cohorts will do less well
than expected during the transition period if the investments used for the
PRAs do badly.
The explicitness of the simulations and the attention to details concern-
ing the current tax system and other macroeconomic parameters are im-
portant strengths of the analysis. Such strengths do not come without
some inherent limitations, however. This paper does not oﬀer a theoretical
justiﬁcation for the reforms suggested. While there is some welfare anal-
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Robert J. Shiller is professor of economics at Yale University and a research associate of
the National Bureau of Economic Research.ysis, there is no economic argument that the proposed reforms are optimal
in any welfare sense. In reading this paper, I missed seeing these and at
times wondered why we were considering these particular reforms since
they are not derived as optimal reforms.
Of course, we economists are not going to be able to agree completely
on an optimal social security reform since we do not agree on fundamental
theory. There are deep, unresolved issues for theorists, such as the equity-
premium puzzle. There is no agreement on values to attach to fundamen-
tal parameters in these models, such as the risk-aversion parameters.
Model builders would ideally have to consider incorporating into their
models such factors as the incapability of certain elements of our popu-
lation, including the mentally retarded or mentally ill, to make well-
informed savings plans for their retirement and then the incentive eﬀects,
discouraging saving, of a preexisting system that bails out people who
do not save. Our existing institutions in some ways discourage saving for
retirement, as by means testing many beneﬁts and services. Model builders
would have to consider the anomalies in saving behavior that have been
documented by some authors, anomalies that suggest human myopia or
other error in savings decisions and the erratic nature of actual human
saving behavior. Any practical policy discussion will also have to deal with
popular notions of fairness and of interpretations of unstated past com-
mitments, factors that are usually ignored in theoretical models.
Meanwhile, practical policy makers must move on, and, at this time of
serious consideration of overhaul of the social security system, we are go-
ing to need concrete policy parameters and explicit consideration of the
eﬀects of the policy changes.
What I ﬁnd most striking about the FRS simulations is that there are
uneven eﬀects on the generations, at least under certain of their assump-
tions. While the paper focuses on the eﬀects across diﬀerent age cohorts
of social security reforms that are expected to leave the existing beneﬁts
unchanged or improved for all cohorts, the reforms do not always treat all
cohorts equally, and some are made worse oﬀ. From tables 2.1 and 2.2,
for example, it is clear, under the assumption that the PRA is paid by the
individual, that in these nonstochastic simulations someone who is born
in 1950, retires before 2020, and dies in 2030 must be made worse oﬀ since
he or she makes higher payments (PAYGO tax rate plus PRA saving rate)
but gets beneﬁts no higher than the benchmark. The person is made worse
oﬀ even though the increases in contributions were credited to what is
called a personal retirement account because that person’s PAYGO beneﬁt
is reduced each year by the increment to the annuity income of the PRA
account. In the stochastic simulations of tables 2.7–2.13, where the
PAYGO beneﬁt is reduced each year by the expected increment to the
annuity income of the PRA account, this individual is not necessarily
worse oﬀ but is worse oﬀ if returns are equal to expected values. The
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ernment, so in this case it would no longer be clear that any given individ-
ual is worse oﬀ for the changes.
One wonders how the authors arrived at their decisions about the taxes
in transition and afterward and whether there is any sense that the pro-
posed transition plan is approximately optimal. This is important to know.
A transition does not have to harm the young today, as some of theirs do.
It might even be possible, if savings currently are artiﬁcially depressed
relative to those in a competitive equilibrium by institutional incentives,
to design a transition that makes the younger generation better oﬀ too.
Moreover, the authors present the reforms as if they are done once and
for all and no further adjustments are needed. One naturally wonders,
then, whether they have any way of knowing how fast we should move to
the new steady state and when we will want to change these tax rates again.
I am reminded of a capital theory literature that ﬂourished in the 1960s
about social welfare and transitions to steady states, a literature that pro-
duced the so-called turnpike theorems. It is worth remembering this litera-
ture here since it gives theories oﬀering some guidance to social planners
intending to make decisions that beneﬁt future generations at the expense
of current generations: the theory can justify taking from one generation
and giving to a subsequent generation and oﬀer some guidance on how
much should be taken. I follow a version of an intergenerational optimal
investment model derived by Samuelson (1972).1 Consider a simple over-
lapping-generations model in which each individual who is young at time
t has utility that depends on consumption when young c1t (in period 1 of
life) and on consumption when old c2t1 (in period 2 of life):
(1) uu c u c tt =+ +
−
+ () ( )( ) , 1
1
21 1 
where u() is instantaneous utility or felicity, and  is the individual’s sub-
jective rate of time preference. The government, the social planner, has a
social utility function that is deﬁned over these individual social utility
functions, taking account of the fact that, on the date of the reform, time
0, there is an existing old generation whose consumption when young can
no longer be changed. The social welfare function is


















where R is the social planner’s rate of time discount, and T is the planning
horizon. A plausible value of R might be R  (1  n)1  1 since this
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1. See also Cass (1966). A concise exposition is in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, 98–102).
As shown here, no account is taken of technical progress. However, under the plausible
assumption of log utility, constant labor-augmenting technical progress would have no eﬀect
on the ﬁrst-order conditions shown here.would mean that the social planner treats everyone the same and takes
account of the fact that there are more people in the future than in the
present. This R is the Lerner (1959) discount rate. If population growth n
is positive, this discount R is negative. Alternatively, it is also plausible
that the government would favor the present or near future generation
over generations in the more distant future, regardless of their numbers,
which would mean that R is positive. Given exogenous population Nt of
young people born at time t, growing at rate n per period, and given a
constant returns-to-scale production function F(Kt, Nt), the social plan-
ner’s resource constraint is
(3) KF K N K N c N c tt t t t t t t += + + +− (,) . 111 2
Or, redeﬁning in terms of the capital divided by young people kt and a
function f(kt) that gives output per young person,
(4) kf k n k c n c tt t t t += ++ + + +
− ( ) () () . 11 11
1
2
The social planner chooses capital so as to maximize the social welfare
function subject to an initial capital stock k0 and a terminal capital stock
kT1. The ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum are
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In a steady state, with consumption, c1t and c2t constant through time t,
and the capital-labor ratio constant through time t at k*, we have, from
(6), the modiﬁed golden rule:
(7) 1 1 1 + ′ =+ + fk R n ( *) ( )( ),
which implies that, if R and n are not too far from zero, the marginal
product of capital is approximately equal to the social planner’s time rate
of discount plus the population-growth rate. There is certainly no ten-
dency in competitive equilibria, in which individuals make their own sav-
ings decisions, for the modiﬁed golden rule to obtain, for the parameter
R appears only in the social welfare function, not in equations relevant to
the competitive equilibrium. There is thus a case for government interven-
tion in the markets by creating institutions like social security, and this
case does not require any such things as dynamic ineﬃciency to be valid.
If we take 1  R  (1  n)1, then the modiﬁed golden rule requires that
the marginal product of capital be driven to zero (as Lerner stressed),
something that certainly has not happened. Even if we do not take Ler-
ner’s extreme position, it seems likely that we have less capital than the
modiﬁed golden rule would suggest. If, disregarding risk, we take the 5.5
percent per annum hypothesized by FRS as the marginal product of capi-
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growth rate of 1 percent a year the social discount rate would have to be
7.5 percent per annum for the modiﬁed golden rule to hold. The intergen-
erational discount factor 1/(1  R) that we would have to apply to subse-
quent generations to make the modiﬁed golden rule hold would be about
0.1. Surely, we attach much more than 10 percent weight to the next gener-
ation’s utility, and this is ultimately why the government interventions
studied by FRS look so attractive (and why Feldstein’s [1977] earlier anal-
yses of the importance of saving looked so impressive).
Starting from a given initial capital stock that I will suppose is below
the amount prescribed by the modiﬁed golden rule, the optimizing govern-
ment will gradually increase the capital stock. It will not increase it too
fast because the only way it can do so is to penalize the people who are
alive then excessively, by making them save too much. The government
weighs the relative hardship imposed on the ﬁrst generation against the
beneﬁts in the future and takes a somewhat gradual transition to the modi-
ﬁed golden rule. In fact, it can be shown that, if the initial capital-labor
ratio k0 is below the equilibrium value, the optimal policy is a gradual
increase in kt until the modiﬁed golden rule is reached, and, then, if the
horizon T is far away, kt will stay almost unchanged for a long time at its
modiﬁed golden rule value, until it ﬁnally moves to the assumed terminal
value kT. It is as if the capital stock follows the path of an entry ramp onto
a turnpike and then, after the transition, stays on a turnpike, the same
turnpike that people starting from other initial conditions (other entry
ramps) would follow.2
Is it possible to interpret the FRS transition path in their simulations in
terms like those used by the Samuelson model? One might wonder whether
it is since the FRS simulations do depict a path of increased saving at ﬁrst
that penalizes the young the most, at least if the PRA contribution is paid
for by the individual rather than the government. The turnpike-entry-
ramp shape is suggestive of the shape of the PAYGO tax rate plus PRA
tax rate described in the paper. But this cannot be exactly the right inter-
pretation of the FRS simulations since in the FRS simulations the as-
sumption is that the marginal product of capital is exogenous and un-
changed by the capital accumulation. If we altered the Samuelson model
by exogenizing the marginal product of capital, then we would lose any
asymmetry between generations. All generations would be treated the
same, and the marginal utility of consumption would grow at a constant
rate through time. Perhaps the authors would think that eventually the
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2. Eventually, the capital stock exits from the turnpike and follows an exit path toward the
terminal value of the capital stock. As we increase T to inﬁnity, the terminal value moves oﬀ
to inﬁnity, and we stay on the modiﬁed golden rule forever; there is no exit. We must solve
the problem for ﬁnite T, however, since, otherwise, the social welfare function does not con-
verge for negative R.PRA saving rate must be lowered if the increased capital stock brings
down the marginal product of capital.
The attractiveness of the FRS plan, which guarantees expected beneﬁts
but does not guarantee the expected contributions of the young today,
may lie in considerations of fairness rather than in the Samuelson consid-
erations of optimal consumption. I think that there is a sense in which the
social security system has been presented to us as promising future bene-
ﬁts but not future contributions. McHale (chap. 7 in this volume) has
shown that, in various countries, changes in social security systems have
taken the form of changes in the plan for the future, not changes in ex-
isting beneﬁts. If this is the political environment in which we live, then
the FRS simulations may be the right ones. By this interpretation, FRS
are trying to move to a socially superior equilibrium without betraying
any real promises.
The stochastic simulations add a critically important dimension to this
analysis since investments in capital, such as stock market investments,
are inherently risky. What will happen if investments are made in the PRAs
and the investments do badly? The nonstochastic simulations shown in
tables 2.1–2.2 could be really misleading since they assume that the 5.5
percent on the sixty-forty stock-bond portfolio is really riskless when in
fact the high return merely reﬂects a risk premium. Perhaps it is better to
look at table 2.3, which assumes a riskless 3.7 percent return.
Tables 2.7–2.13 show a picture in which the risks of a bad outcome do
not look so bad, especially if we require a higher saving rate initially (to
provide a better saving cushion) (table 2.8). If the government guarantees
the benchmark beneﬁt level, then the risk of a substantial tax burden
caused by poor investment outcome appears to be low (table 2.9).
I think that there is some question that the risks of bad outcomes are
as small as were simulated here. We are looking here at returns over many
decades. The historical data on such returns are extremely sparse; we have
only a few observations on the returns on the market over several decades.
There is fundamental uncertainty about such issues as the extent of mean
reversion in stock prices.
The extreme case considered here is one in which the government guar-
antees 100 percent of the benchmark beneﬁt levels. Of course, government
guarantees mean that shortfalls are met by taxing working people. The
young might be doubly taxed in the transition: not only must they pay
much of the transition cost to a funded system, but they must also bear
the risk of underperformance, on behalf of the retired people. While the
FRSsimulationssuggestthatthisriskissmall,Iwonderwhethertheconsid-
erations of past promises really require such an unequal bearing of costs.
I would have liked to have seen a stochastic version of the turnpike
model above that allows us to consider the optimal risk sharing along the
transition path, but I realize that that is beyond the scope of this paper.
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by any political reality, I think that we should consider alternatives that
involve better sharing of risks between generations. We should consider
systems in which, as Rangel and Zeckhauser (chap. 4 in this volume) de-
scribe, there can be transfers of wealth from the old to the young (when
the young are hit by bad shocks) as well as from young to old (when the
old are hit by bad shocks).
If the only choices that we have to make are between the existing system
with existing savings rates and one of the FRS transitions to an all-PRA
or a partial PRA social security, however, I ﬁnd myself attracted to one of
the latter. The simulations show that the contribution rate is ultimately
much smaller and, with high probability, the beneﬁts better. Those of us
who do not have very high social discount rates may ﬁnd the FRS simu-
lated reforms very attractive.
However, the timing of the adoption of these reforms may be bad. I
think that the current overpricing of the stock market means that condi-
tionally, for the foreseeable future, we cannot expect historical expected
returns on the market to continue. It could be very damaging to public
support of any new social security regime if its adoption is immediately
followed by signiﬁcant stock market losses. Alternatively, while there may
be no sudden losses in the stock market, the higher valuation in the market
today may mean that expected returns on the FRS sixty-forty stock-bond
portfolio going forward are much less than the 5.5 percent assumed in
their simulations.
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Discussion Summary
Antonio Rangel asked the authors to clarify the source of the funds needed
to pay oﬀ the unfunded liabilities of the current system in table 2.1. In
When Portfolio Returns and Capital Proﬁtability Are Uncertain 87addition, he noted that it would be useful for understanding the cost of
transition to know what fraction is paid oﬀ indirectly, that is, ﬁnanced by
welfare gains from reductions in distortions. Second, he remarked that
the analysis of the paper involves important but implicit intergenerational
transfers. In combination with the risk associated with an investment-
based system, the relevant benchmark to use is expected utility rather than
the probability of a shortfall.
Rangel also remarked that fat tails or extreme risks could be an interest-
ing ingredient of a study focusing on the probability of a shortfall. Finally,
he noted that labor-income risk and especially the correlation of wages
with equity returns could greatly aﬀect the results. In particular, if taxes
have to be increased to make up for a drop in beneﬁts caused by a collapse
in the stock market, then this tax increase will be especially painful if
wages are also low.
John McHale remarked that Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) con-
tained very interesting utility calculations. These are missing from the cur-
rent paper. Utility calculations would be very informative about the wel-
fare of the current generation along the transition path to an investment-
based system.
Stephen Ross expressed the opinion that the simulation exercise in the
paper seriously underestimates the risk of equity returns. This underesti-
mation has two sources. First, the simulation ignores the standard error
for the estimate of the mean return. Taking this estimation risk into ac-
count would substantially aﬀect the tails of the distribution. The second
reason for his criticism is that normal distributions are not an appropriate
modeling device for studying shortfall probabilities. Using a bootstrap
technique instead would allow for fatness of the tails of the return distribu-
tion. Second, Ross noted that ﬁnancial markets have elaborate ways of
estimating volatilities forward. He suggested taking advantage of this tech-
nology, not only to estimate the value of the put option represented by
the beneﬁt guarantee, but also to obtain information about the volatility
of returns.
Robert King made two comments. First, related to Ross’s last comment,
he noted that the paper describes some form of public portfolio insurance.
It would be interesting to link this to other estimates of the cost of (pri-
vate) portfolio insurance, perhaps on the basis of current market instru-
ments. Second, in response to the discussion by Robert Shiller of transi-
tion dynamics, he wondered how fast the transition takes place in a
Diamond-style overlapping-generations model. He added that the transi-
tion dynamics of a standard neoclassical growth model are typically be-
lieved to be quite fast.
James Poterba suggested using the utility function to value the cost of
negative outcomes. He furthermore agreed with Rangel that one might
want to consider labor income in this context: scenarios with low returns
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making it particularly costly to pay the additional taxes necessary to pro-
vide the beneﬁt guarantee.
Richard Zeckhauser commented on the issue of the tail probabilities. In
this context, he suggested incorporating some of the insights of the paper
by McHale (chap. 7 in this volume), by looking at pessimistic scenarios
from the past. This should also be considered in the benchmark of a regu-
lar politically controlled pay-as-you-go social security system, possibly by
allowing for downward modiﬁcations of the beneﬁt entitlements in ad-
verse scenarios.
Stephen Zeldes noted that the cost of transition seems low. The cost is
around 3 percent of payroll for thirty-ﬁve years, followed by a period of
zero cost, after which the cost becomes eventually negative. Zeldes re-
marked that in Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999), the transition
cost was roughly computed to be 3 percent forever. These results can at
least partially be reconciled by noting the diﬀerence in the assumed real
equity premium earned by the investment-based system: the premium
used in this work was 2.3 percent, as opposed to the 5.5 percent assumed
in the Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick paper. Zeldes concluded that
it would be useful to know to what extent the diﬀerence in the transition
cost is actually due to the rate-of-return assumption. The authors could
repeat their calculations using the riskless rate instead of the historical
equity premium and would thereby also conduct some useful sensitivity
analysis.
John Campbell followed up on Shiller’s comment about mean reversion
in stock returns and noted that mean reversion cuts both ways in an inter-
esting fashion. As mentioned by the discussant, it makes investors wary
of stocks at a time when the market appears to be overvalued. However,
on average, mean reversion also reduces one’s estimate of the long-run
risk of stocks, an idea popularized by Siegel (1998). Therefore, mean re-
version may actually boost the demand for stocks, for a given equity pre-
mium.
With respect to the issue of mean reversion and the associated current
wariness of stocks because of their perceived overvaluation, Martin
Feldstein noted that this would actually make an investment-based plan
more attractive. Indeed, if a severe market correction occurs in the near
future, the subsequent situation is ideal for initiating such a system.
Second, Feldstein remarked that the paper does not contain a true pro-
posal because completely eliminating the existing pay-as-you-go system is
not politically feasible. Instead, the current system would most likely be
complemented by a plan that corresponds to around one-third of the
investment-based plan analyzed in the paper. This of course scales down
all the risks correspondingly.
When Portfolio Returns and Capital Proﬁtability Are Uncertain 89In response to the discussant’s question of why setting up an entirely
new and optimal social security system is not being considered, Feldstein
noted that it was probably too complicated to redo everything and start
from scratch.
Regarding the concern expressed by Rangel and Zeldes about the cost
of transition, Feldstein agreed that this cost was low because of the high
return to capital. He further clariﬁed that the transition cost as computed
in this paper does not reﬂect welfare gains in the form of smaller dead-
weight losses resulting from the elimination of some distortions. He added
that a full welfare analysis would incorporate these additional gains.
Feldstein noted that previous versions of the paper did report expected-
utility calculations. These also contained calculations for the 1 and 2 per-
cent tails of the distribution. The results are in line with what is obtained
in this paper and will be included in the ﬁnal version. Finally, the authors
promised that the revised version of the paper in the volume would deal
correctly with the estimation-error issue raised by Ross.
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